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This study developed tools for assessing the distributional effects of alternative highway user 
fees for light vehicles in Oregon.  The analysis used the example of a change from the current 
gasoline tax to a VMT fee structure for collecting highway user fees.  The questions 
addressed were as follows: 
1) Would the change to a VMT fee be regressive, placing disproportionate hardship on 
those in lower income groups?  
2) Would rural areas in Oregon be adversely impacted relative to urban areas? 
3) Would a change to a VMT fee discourage people from acquiring alternative fuel 
vehicles or more fuel efficient vehicles and thus would be contrary to the state and 
national priority of reducing fossil fuel use? 
 
A static model and a regression model were developed and used to provide answers to the 
first two questions.  A discrete-continuous choice model was also explored and recommended 
for future development to better address the third issue. 
Results indicated that the income distributional impact of changing to an approximately 
revenue-neutral VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile would result in a slight increase in regressivity 
relative to the regressive structure of the current gasoline tax.  The impact  for the lowest 
income group amounted to a change of less than one percent of their income.  As a 
comparison, the increase in total gasoline expenditures that was caused by the near doubling 
of gasoline prices from $1.46/ gallon to $2.64/gallon between 2001 and 2006 was over five 
percent of income for the lowest income group. 
The impact of the change to a VMT fee on rural areas was found to be opposite to that 
suggested by conventional wisdom.  On average a household in a rural location would pay 
less under a revenue-neutral VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile than under the gasoline tax, 
whereas those in urban areas would pay slightly more.  This was largely due to the lower 
overall average fuel efficiency in the rural vehicle fleet relative to the urban fleet and the 
greater number of miles driven on average by rural households. 
Results suggested that a change to a VMT fee would not be likely to create a significant 
disincentive to purchase more fuel efficient or hybrid vehicles.  This was because the change 
in fee structure had such a small impact on the cost of driving relative to the price of gasoline.  
Indeed, continued increases in gasoline prices would dwarf any change in per-mile costs 
caused by the change in user fee structure considered here.  It is higher gasoline prices that 
are likely to produce the increases in driving costs of the magnitude necessary to create the 
incentive to adopt more fuel efficient vehicles.   
The study concluded that a change from the current gasoline tax to a VMT fee structure of 
the type considered in this study, would have a negligible impact on income distribution.  
Further, concerns that rural households would be adversely impacted by the change in fee 
structure were unfounded, as rural households would actually benefit relative to urban 
households.  Preliminary results suggested that the change in user fee structure considered 
x 
here would not be likely to significantly impact vehicle choice.  If future promotion of more 
fuel efficient vehicles is a policy priority, further development of the discrete-continuous 
choice model would be desirable to have a tool that can better predict how policy changes 






The purpose of this study was to develop analytical tools for examining the distributional 
impact of changing from the current state gasoline tax to a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee.  
Interest in this topic has arisen because it has become evident that the gasoline tax – the 
primary way that highway user fees are collected at both state and federal levels in the U.S. – 
may no longer be able to generate the funds needed to build and maintain the highway 
system.  That this has become a national concern is evidenced by the 2006 Transportation  
Research Board Special Report #285 submitted by the TRB committee for the study of the 
long-term viability of fuel taxes for highway finance (TRB 2006). 
There are several reasons for the inadequacy of the gasoline tax as a long-term source of 
highway finance.   First, public resistance to increases in the gasoline tax at both federal and 
state levels results in highway revenue growth falling short of the growth in highway costs.  
The current Oregon state gasoline tax of 24 cents per gallon has been in effect since 1991, 
when this tax represented over 20 percent of the price of a gallon of gasoline.  Today, with 
gasoline prices around $4.00/gallon, the 24-cent-per-gallon tax is about six percent of the 
price of gasoline.  During this same time period, the purchasing power of highway revenues 
has eroded as the cost of construction materials such as concrete and steel has increased even 
faster than inflation.   
Potentially exacerbating the highway finance shortfall in the future is the development of 
alternative fuels, which are not currently subject to gasoline/diesel fuel taxes, together with 
increases in fuel efficiency.  These factors have made it clear that an alternative to the 
gasoline tax will be necessary if highways are to be maintained and built to meet current and 
future needs (Forkenbrock 2002).   
This state of affairs in highway finance became such an important concern that the State of 
Oregon established a Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) in 2001 to consider alternatives to 
the gasoline tax for funding road maintenance and improvement.  The RUFTF concluded that 
a distance-based fee, or vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee, was one of the most promising 
alternatives to the gasoline tax.   
One obstacle to collecting a VMT fee has been the absence of a technology sophisticated 
enough to count vehicle miles driven in the state.  However, in a previous Oregon 
Department of Transportation (ODOT) study researchers at Oregon State University 
developed and tested a technology that would allow collection of highway user fees in this 
manner (Whitty, et al. 2006).  With further development, the technology is no longer likely to 
be a real constraint on the establishment of a highway user fee. 
Perhaps more problematic than the technology are public concerns regarding social equity 
and distributional effects of a VMT fee.  In Oregon several concerns are expressed regularly 
to policymakers: 
1. It has been suggested that the change in tax structure would shift the burden of the tax 
to lower income groups.  
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2. There is a concern that the change in the tax structure would shift the burden of the 
tax to rural areas from urban areas, creating regional or geographic inequities. 
3. Concerns have been expressed that such a shift in tax structure would discourage 
people from purchasing and driving alternative fuel vehicles, hybrids in particular.   
The purpose of this research was to provide a perspective on these three issues that are often 
raised in objection to the implementation of a VMT fee.  The following section in this chapter 
reviews the existing literature and approaches to these questions.  Chapter 2 provides a 
discussion of the different models and methods that can be used to evaluate the impact of 
changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee.  Chapter 3 reviews the data available for this 
study and provides summary statistics for the state of Oregon.  Chapters 4 and 5 provide the 
results obtained for Oregon, first using a static model and then using an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model that accounts for the feedback effects of a change in tax on demand.  
Chapter 6 presents the preliminary framework for a more sophisticated discrete choice-
continuous model that would allow longer-term impact evaluation.  Conclusions are 
presented in the final chapter along with recommendations for future research on a distance-
based fee. 
1.1 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
From an economic point of view, and from the perspective of policymakers, the purpose of 
either a gasoline tax or a VMT fee is to charge an optimal road user fee. An optimal road user 
fee is one in which the users of the road pay the marginal costs they impose on the road 
system.  There is an extensive literature on optimal road user fees under both congested and 
uncongested circumstances (Morrison 1986; Small, Winston and Evans 1989).   
There are two components to a user fee for the road system: road wear costs and congestion 
costs. Maintenance costs for pavement are the primary component of road wear costs.  
Congestion costs are incurred when traffic does not flow freely, indicating that road capacity 
has been reached (Small, Winston and Evans 1989). 
When there is congestion, optimal user fees will be higher than in non-congested 
circumstances, and revenues collected may exceed those required to maintain the existing 
road system, thus providing funds for capacity increases.  The implementation of optimal 
congestion fees and their political acceptability is the major focus of much research and 
experimentation in the area of road pricing.  Except for a few select urban areas, congestion 
pricing is not in place and represents a major change from what road users are accustomed to 
paying. 
Although this study could easily be extended to consider issues involved in charging 
congestion fees, the main focus here will be on road user fees under non-congested 
circumstances.  What distinguishes this from congestion pricing is that in almost all 
countries, road users already pay a road user fee.  Thus, a change from the gasoline tax to a 
VMT fee does not represent a new tax, but rather a different way of collecting user fees that 
are already being paid.   
Indeed, the “user-pay” concept as a basic financing principle in transportation dates back to 
Pigou in the 1920s.  Under ideal conditions, the revenue collected from marginal cost tolls 
will just be sufficient to finance the transportation network to its optimal level of capacity 
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(Mohring and Harwitz 1962). In practice, however, this simple and elegant road pricing and 
investment principle encounters technological, institutional, and political difficulties. 
In 1919 Oregon became the first state to impose a fuel tax to raise money to finance road 
maintenance and construction; other states quickly followed suit (McMullen 2005). In years 
past, the gasoline tax was generally seen as an equitable and efficient way of charging road 
user fees for light vehicles such as autos and pickup trucks, since there were not the large 
differences in fuel efficiency that we see today.  Miles driven and thus road damage were 
highly correlated to gasoline consumption.  Given the wide disparity of fuel efficiencies in 
the current vehicle fleet, however, the gasoline tax has become a less accurate reflection of 
the marginal costs users impose on the road system.   
In the state of Oregon, heavy trucks (weighing over 26,000 pounds) are subject to a weight-
mile tax which provides a reasonably good approximation of the marginal damage that they 
do to the roads.  In the case of heavy trucks, the damage that they do to the roads is 
exponentially and directly related to their weight (Small, Winston and Evans 1989).  Thus, 
trucks operating in the state of Oregon already pay a distance-based fee and one that carries 
higher tax rates for truck configurations that impose greater costs on the road system.  Light 
vehicles (up to 26,000 pounds) in Oregon still pay road user fees through fuel taxes.   
Short run marginal road costs from autos and other light vehicles are directly related to miles 
driven and, despite increasing variance in vehicle weights (and fuel efficiency), there is not 
much difference in the damage done to the road by different types of light vehicles (whereas 
there is a big difference in damage to the road done by heavy trucks of different weight 
groups and with different axle configurations).   Indeed, Merriss (2004) notes that  the 
“difference in pavement damage imposed by a 6,000-pound large SUV versus a 3,500-pound 
compact car is inconsequential as compared to the difference in (pavement) damage imposed 
by either of these vehicles versus a fully-loaded 80,000-pound truck” (p.2). 
Of the vehicle miles driven in the state of Oregon in 2002, 92 percent of the vehicle-miles 
driven were attributable to light vehicles.   Thus, Merriss (2004) argues that the primary way 
light vehicles affect highway costs is through the sheer numbers of miles they drive and their 
impact on congestion, thus producing the demand for additional road capacity. 
Konkelman and Shahib (2000) argue that light trucks and SUV’s increase headways between 
vehicles, reducing the capacity at intersections and increasing urban congestion.   Thus, in the 
long run, when capacity expansions are considered or when the goal is to alleviate 
congestion, it might be better to follow the current convention in use in the Oregon Highway 
Cost Allocation Study, and charge light vehicles on the basis of their passenger car equivalent 
(PCE) weighted vehicle-miles rather than vehicle miles alone.    
Sorenson and Taylor (2005) argue that equity concerns are not so great for a “straight” 
distance-based user fee that is not linked to a congestion fee, and they suggest introducing a 
vehicle mile fee first and later revising it to accommodate congestion pricing. 
Whatever the exact fee structure, the main goal for a state government is to charge road user 
fees that will provide an adequate source of finance for the highway system. It should be 
noted that Oregon dedicates all highway user fees to the Highway fund unlike many other 
states, which place highway user fees into a general fund, mixing revenue sources.  The 
proposed change from a gasoline tax to a vehicle-mile or distance-based fee for light vehicles 
in Oregon would come closer to meeting this objective than the current gasoline tax.  Indeed, 
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a VMT fee is something that is being considered not only by the State of Oregon, but at the 
national level (TRB 2006). 
The following sections discuss and provide a preliminary review of the potential socio-
economic/political impacts resulting from such a change in tax structure.    
1.1.1 General incidence 
To determine the distributional impact of changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee 
requires first determining the general incidence of the gasoline tax – who pays the gasoline 
tax, the gasoline retailer or the consumer?  
Alm and Sonnoga (2005) find full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer.  
Chouinard and Perloff (2004) find that while the federal gas tax falls about half on the 
consumer and half on the gasoline retailer, they find that virtually all of a state gasoline tax is 
borne by the retail customer.  In addition, they find that the incidence of state gasoline taxes 
on the consumer is inversely related to the share of national gasoline tax sales in the state; 
thus a greater part of the state gas tax is borne by customers in states with a smaller share of 
the national gasoline bill.  Based on these findings, in the case of Oregon it is reasonable to 
assume that it is the consumer, rather than the retailer, who ends up paying the state gasoline 
tax.   
For a VMT fee, it is clear that the tax is being paid by the final consumer.  Thus, for practical 
purposes it makes no difference which way the road user fee is collected; it is ultimately paid 
by the consumer in the state of Oregon. 
1.1.2 Income Distributional Impact 
Since the demand for gasoline is known to be inelastic, it is usually argued that the gasoline 
tax is regressive.  
A 1990 Congressional Budget Office Report (CBO 1990) found that the tax on motor fuels 
was regressive relative to annual income but generally proportional with respect to total 
expenditures. 
Sarah West (2001, 2005) explores the distributional impact of implementing vehicle 
emissions taxes on automobiles, and her work touches on a number of issues relevant to our 
study.  West follows Poterba’s (1991) suggestion that household expenditures be used rather 
than household income in examining tax incidence.  His argument is that decisions regarding 
gasoline expenditures may be based on lifetime or permanent income rather than the annual 
income observed in a typical cross-section study. He uses annual expenditures as a proxy for 
permanent income, and his results show that low income households actually devote a 
smaller share of their expenditures to gasoline than higher income households.  Further, he 
finds that households in the top five percent of the income distribution spend a smaller 
percent on gasoline, so that the gasoline tax actually is progressive over lower income groups 
and then turns regressive at higher levels of income.   
West (2001) uses expenditures as a proxy for income and finds the gasoline tax to be 
progressive across lower income groups, a result she attributes to the greater elasticity of 
demand lower income groups have in response to changes in gasoline prices.  In her 
empirical results, she also examines the impact of a per-mile emissions tax and finds that 
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taxes on miles is progressive over lower income deciles (as a percentage of total household 
expenditures) but becomes regressive over the upper deciles. 
For a gasoline tax, the regressivity depends in part on how responsive the miles driven by 
people in different income groups are to changes in the tax (included in the price of gasoline).  
It also depends on the type of vehicle driven by people in the different income groups as well 
as the number of miles driven by people in the various income groups. 
West and Williams (2004) argue that ignoring demand responses to changes in gasoline 
prices will result in more regressive measures.  Thus, one reason for West’s (2001) results is 
that she finds that the elasticity of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) with respect to changes in 
the per mile cost of driving, is greater (-1.51) for those in the lowest decile of income than 
those in the higher deciles. (For example, she finds an elasticity of -0.75 for those in decile 8 
in her sample.)  This elasticity, combined with the fact that a large proportion of households 
in the lowest decile do not own vehicles and thus do not pay any gasoline tax, results in the 
gasoline tax being less regressive than conventional wisdom may dictate. 
At this point it is important to raise the question of whether the finding that the gasoline tax is 
progressive at lower income levels is really providing the right information about the welfare 
of people in the lower income groups.  While those in the lower income groups may pay 
proportionally less of their income in gasoline taxes than the upper income groups, this may 
well be because they face significant mobility and access limitations due to their income 
status.  For instance, low income households are more likely to not own a vehicle; thus they 
do not bear the burden of gasoline taxes, but they may have mobility problems and suffer 
consequences in the job market as a result.  The elderly also have lower vehicle ownership 
rates, so they appear to be less affected by gasoline taxes, but this reflects their mobility 
constraints.  If all income levels had the same mobility and car ownership characteristics, it 
might be that the gasoline tax would be regressive over all income groups.  Thus, care must 
be taken in interpreting these income incidence measures. 
It is important to note that the incidence of the gasoline tax depends partly on the vehicle 
choice made by different income groups.  West (2001) argues that households in the lower 
deciles own vehicles that have poorer gas mileage, making their per mile cost of gasoline 
higher than those in higher income groups.  This contributes to making the price elasticity of 
that group more sensitive to changes in tax rates. Given that West’s data comes from the 
1980’s when auto manufacturers were just retooling and starting to produce more fuel 
efficient vehicles, this finding makes sense, because lower income people who were unable to 
purchase the new vehicles had to make do with less fuel efficient, older models.    
In the 1990’s, however, there have been mixed messages regarding fuel efficiency.  On one 
hand there have been very fuel efficient cars that have come on the market, but conventional 
wisdom suggests that many people in the middle/upper income groups have gravitated 
towards heavier SUVs that get fewer miles per gallon.  Thus the trend towards greater fuel 
efficiency slowed during the 1990’s.  This complicates the measurement of tax incidence and 
suggests that the gasoline tax may not be as regressive as once thought.  Clearly any study of 
the incidence of the gasoline tax needs to consider the vehicle mix across income groups as 
well as the elasticity of demand for gasoline across income groups. 
Interestingly, Zupnick (1975) looked at the incidence of gasoline taxes during the 1969-70 
period using annual income data (rather than consumer expenditures) and a static model that 
does not account for demand responses.  He found similar results to West and Proterba: that 
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the gasoline tax was progressive over lower income groups and then turned regressive for 
upper middle and upper income groups.  Zupnick’s conclusion was that it was the middle 
class that incurred the largest burden from the gasoline tax. 
Finally, there was a big change in gasoline prices between the Zupnick and West study 
period, and nominal gasoline prices today are much higher than those experienced in either of 
the earlier periods.  Today fuel taxes are small compared to the price of gasoline. Vehicle 
choice and usage will depend on overall gasoline price, not the fuel tax.  Thus, the 
distributional effects from more recent data may be different than those from earlier studies.   
The West (2005) and Proterba (1991) studies examined incidence for the entire U.S. using the 
measure of consumption expenditure from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES).  For the 
state of Oregon, however, the CES did not provide a large enough data set for this study. In 
addition to income distribution, the investigators also wanted to see how a change in the road 
user tax structure would change the way in which individual households traded off using 
different household vehicles (in particular high- versus low-mileage vehicle use).  
Information on individual vehicle usage (miles) was not available in the CES data set; only 
total household mileage was given. 
Thus, the investigators used the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) as the primary 
data source for this study.  Data were available on individual household vehicles; however 
only annual household income was available, not annual expenditures as advocated by West 
and Proterba.  Fortunately, Zupnick’s results indicated that the possible bias, introduced by 
using annual income rather than expenditures, may not be a serious problem.  
1.1.3 Geographic impact  
In the state of Oregon there is a deep concern that changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT 
fee will adversely impact rural areas relative to urban areas.   It is usually argued that since 
there are fewer transportation alternatives in rural areas, the demand for miles driven in rural 
areas will likely be more inelastic than in urban areas.  Changing the pricing mechanism may 
thus have little (or no) impact on driving behavior in rural areas. In other words, the elasticity 
of demand for vehicle miles, in response to a change in tax, is inelastic.   
However, the response of VMT to changes in the cost of driving also will depend on the type 
of vehicles driven in rural areas relative to urban areas.  The total impact on the rural/urban 
areas will depend on the number of miles driven by those impacted by a tax change. 
Assuming a flat revenue-neutral VMT fee, the current 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax would 
change to a 1.2 cents-per-mile distance-based fee. Under this VMT fee people who drive 
vehicles with a fuel efficiency of less than 20 miles per gallon (mpg) would actually pay less 
in road user fees than under the gasoline tax.  Those who now drive vehicles with fuel 
efficiency exceeding 20 mpg would pay more.  Thus, the distributional impact on urban/rural 
as well as high/low income groups depends in turn on what type of vehicle is used by the 
different households. 
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1.1.4 Impact on the Adoption of Alternative Fuel Vehicles 
Finally there is concern that owners of fuel efficient vehicles would end up having to pay 
more in road user fees under a VMT fee than under the current gasoline tax.  Will this 
discourage the use of fuel efficient vehicles, hybrids in particular? 
If a vehicle gets 50 mpg, under the current Oregon gasoline tax it would be paying $0.24/50 
miles or about $0.0048 (0.48 cents) per mile.  This amount is 40% of the 1.2 cents per mile 
estimated for a revenue-neutral VMT fee.  If gasoline, exclusive of tax were $3.75 per gallon, 
the 50 mpg vehicle driver would be paying 7.5 cents per mile in gasoline expense plus 0.48 
cents per mile in tax, or about 7.98 cents per mile.    With a VMT fee this would rise to 8.7 
cents per mile, increasing the per-mile combined gasoline and tax cost of driving by 0.72 
cents, about 9 percent.  Recent AAA estimates of per-mile total costs of driving range 
between 50 cents and 66 cents per mile; thus the 0.72 cents higher cost due to a VMT fee 
would translate into less than a 2% difference in the overall driving cost per mile.  Is this 
enough to make people decide not to buy a hybrid?   
Unfortunately, there is not yet a good enough data set available to estimate a demand function 
for hybrid vehicles that would allow calculation of the price elasticity of demand for a change 
of this magnitude in operating expenses.  However, given the fact that this represents a very 
small amount compared to the purchase price of the vehicle, it is likely that the impact would 
be negligible.  In fact, current sales of hybrids are taking place despite the fact that the new 
vehicle price of a hybrid is often $2,000-5,000 more than the purchase price for a comparable 
regular fuel vehicle. 
In addition, while some hybrid vehicles get very high fuel economy (greater than 40 mpg), 
others do not.  In particular, many of the newer hybrids are aimed at the SUV market, and 
while the fuel economy of these vehicles is higher than a comparable non-hybrid model, it is 
possible that people who were driving more fuel efficient smaller cars are now buying larger 
vehicles with the same mileage as their smaller car.   The net result could be the same amount 
of total fuel consumed, but an increase in the average size of vehicles. Such an outcome 
would mirror the phenomenon observed in the 1990s: as vehicles became more fuel efficient 
the vehicle mix turned more towards larger vehicles. 
It should be noted that the point of hybrid subsidies is not to reduce fuel consumption in the 
short run but to promote the development of a market to improve a fuel saving technology 
and reduce the cost of the technology.  It is also hoped that in the medium to long run it will 
substantially reduce fuel consumption. 
There is also the interrelated question of the distributional impact of promotion of hybrid 
vehicles. West (2005) argues that policymakers have tended to try and promote the use of 
hybrids through various types of subsidies such as tax credits on new cars.  Since these 
vehicles usually cost more and are usually purchased by those in the higher range of the 
income distribution, she claims that either gasoline taxes or mile-based fees are significantly 
less regressive than these subsidies. 
It is, of course, possible to charge different VMT fee rates depending on the vehicle size or 
passenger car equivalents (PCE).  Indeed, promoters of high fuel efficiency vehicles often 
suggest charging “gas guzzlers” (which are usually higher weight, larger vehicles) a higher 
fee to encourage people to switch to more fuel efficient and environmentally friendly 
vehicles.  However, given the currently contemplated mileage fees in the 1-2 cent per mile 
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range, Forkenbrock (2000) argues that “it is not clear that varying per-mile rates among types 
of passenger vehicles will constitute a significant incentive to purchase and operate 
environmentally friendly vehicles” (p. 97). 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the impact of a change from a 24 cent-per-gallon gasoline tax to a 1.2 
cent-per-mile VMT fee on drivers of vehicles with differing fuel efficiency. 
 
 













Figure 1.1: Per Mile Fuel Costs under Gas Tax and VMT Tax for Vehicles with Different Fuel 
Clearly people with vehicles that get less than 20 mpg would pay less under a VMT fee and 
those with vehicles attaining more than 20 mpg would pay more, but is the amount enough to 
cause a significant change in behavior? 
Ball (2007) in a recent Wall Street Journal article quotes Robert Socolow, professor at 
Princeton University as saying that a carbon emissions cap that raises the price of gasoline by 
30 cents a gallon would be “… not enough to prod many people to go out and buy a more 
efficient car.”  Indeed, recent increases in the retail price of gasoline have been in this range 
and thus provide a unique opportunity to observe the impact on fuel efficient automobile 
purchases in the next few years.  
1.1.5 Other contexts in which a distance-based mileage fee has been 
examined 
Although there are no studies that empirically examine the use of a VMT fee for collecting 
road user fees, there is a developing literature that looks at vehicle mileage fees as a 
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mechanism for collecting emissions taxes.  West (2005) and Parry and Small (2005) all find 
the mileage fee to be a much better instrument for approximating optimal emissions fees than 
a gasoline tax.  Thus, a VMT fee for road users may well have the additional social benefit of 
reducing emissions. 
Finally, DeCorla-Souza (2001), Litman (1999, 2006), and Edlin (2002) discuss the benefits of 
distance-based insurance. Greater economic efficiency can be achieved by turning fixed 
costs, such as vehicle insurance, into variable costs.  In theory, fixed costs are not considered 
when making marginal decisions.  For example, once a driver pays the insurance premium, 
there is no incentive to limit the distance driven; in fact, assuming there is some utility to gain 
from increasing miles driven, there is actually an incentive to drive more.  
A distance-based fee gives all drivers the option to reduce miles driven and save money.  
DeCorla-Souza (2001) uses social cost estimates from Delucchi (1997) to estimate the 
impacts of an optional distance-based insurance program including the effect on externalities 
such as pollution and accidents.  He estimates that the total value of social benefits from an 
optimal distance-based insurance charge program could be as large as $2,914 per mile under 
congested road conditions.  
Thus it is timely to provide a complete analysis of the overall socio-economic impact of 
changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee.  In addition to providing state Departments of 
Transportation with a more reliable source of revenue, such a system might provide added 
social benefits as described above.  This study thus explores some analytical tools 
policymakers might use to evaluate the socio-economic impacts. 
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2.0 MODELING THE IMPACT OF A VMT FEE ON OREGON 
HOUSEHOLDS 
This chapter examines alternative methodologies for analyzing the impact of a change from a 
gasoline tax to a VMT fee on households and regions.   
The first methodology pursued is referred to as the static model.  This is a method frequently 
used by the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to evaluate the distributional 
impact of changes in tax structure on households in different income groups.  This method 
assumes that the tax change itself will cause no behavioral response.   Although this method 
is known to overstate increases in tax burden and understate decreases in tax burden, the JCT 
advocates this approach largely on the grounds that it is easily understood by policymakers 
who may get lost in details of more complex analyses.  This is particularly appropriate if the 
changes are likely to be very small. 
The other approaches discussed in this chapter involve models that account for behavioral 
responses to changes in the cost of driving that are caused by the change in tax structure.  
Three econometric modeling approaches are found particularly suitable for this objective: 
multiple regression analysis, a simultaneous equation model, and a discrete-continuous 
choice model. These models vary in their behavioral realism, data requirements, and policy 
sensitivity.   
This chapter begins the discussion of the alternative econometric approaches with a review of 
the modeling objectives. Following this is a review of previous research on vehicle ownership 
and use models. The chapter concludes with a summary of the advantages and disadvantages 
of each approach.  
2.1 MODELING OBJECTIVES 
Given the current Oregon state gasoline tax of $0.24 per gallon, drivers pay different amounts 
of taxes per mile driven due to variations in vehicle fuel efficiency (i.e., miles per gallon).  A 
1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee would result in a revenue-neutral change under the assumption 
that the average vehicle in Oregon has a 20 miles-per-gallon (mpg) fuel efficiency.  
Therefore, under such a VMT fee the effective fuel cost per mile including taxes would 
increase for a vehicle with fuel efficiency greater than 20 mpg and decrease for a vehicle with 
fuel efficiency less than 20 mpg.   
According to the standard microeconomic demand theory, a change in fuel cost per mile can 
be expected to induce a range of behavioral responses from Oregon households.  In the near 
term, households may change their total number of trips, destinations, modes, routes, and the 
relative use of different household vehicles (if the households have more than one type of 
vehicle, e.g., a car and an SUV).  In the medium term, households can change both the 
number and the type of vehicles they own.  In the long term, per-mile fuel cost changes may 
even affect households’ residential and employment location decisions, though such 
relocation effects should not be very significant.   
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The near-term and medium-term potential demand responses can be divided into two 
categories: changes in vehicle use (measured by vehicle miles driven) and changes in vehicle 
ownership (number and type of vehicles). It should be noted that these demand responses are 
interrelated. For instance, an increase in the fuel cost per mile should cause a household to 
drive less in the short run. However, if the household decides to purchase new vehicles with 
lower fuel costs per mile sometime in the future, the total household vehicle use could 
increase again; (this is the “rebound” effect of increasing fuel efficiency). 
It is also expected that a change to a VMT fee would not affect all Oregon households the 
same. First, different households exhibit dissimilar vehicle ownership characteristics. The 
impact of a flat-rate VMT fee on households that primarily own fuel efficient vehicles should 
differ from the impact on households that primarily own pickup trucks and SUVs. In 
addition, households with multiple vehicles and multiple vehicle types can switch their 
vehicle use more towards the vehicle(s) with relatively lower fuel cost per mile.   
Second, households with lower incomes are likely to be more sensitive to per-mile fuel cost 
changes. Third, households living in different regions can respond differently to changes in 
fuel cost per mile. For instance, it is often argued that rural households drive more than urban 
households due to different land use patterns. Urban residents also enjoy better public transit 
services and more destination options than their rural counterparts. Consequently, urban 
households could more easily adjust their travel behavior if a VMT fee were implemented.  
The distributional effects of the VMT fee are therefore multifold, which imposes challenges 
on model capabilities.  
The purpose of this study is to provide the necessary analytical tools to compare the 
incidence of a VMT fee to the incidence of the current per-gallon gasoline tax. The modeling 
objective is therefore to quantify the vehicle ownership and use changes for different 
household groups in response to the conversion from the gasoline tax to a flat-rate VMT fee. 
It is also desirable that the models developed in this project can estimate the demand 
responses to graduated (i.e., variable-rate) VMT fees (by location, by fuel efficiency, etc.). 
Results from the modeling can be used in policy analysis to estimate the distributional effects 
of various VMT fee structures.  
Data availability is an important issue for all empirical modeling work. A summary of data 
availability and a detailed description of the main data source – the National Household 
Travel Survey (NHTS) – are presented in the following chapter.  It is sufficient here to note 
that the ability to successfully estimate all of the models discussed in this chapter depends 
critically on the availability of requisite data.  
2.2 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS VEHICLE OWNERSHIP AND USE 
MODELS 
Choices of automobile ownership and use have been extensively studied by economists, land 
use and transportation planners, public policy analysts, environmental protection agencies, 
and automobile manufacturers. Models of vehicle ownership and use have been successfully 
developed and applied in previous research to conduct a variety of important planning and 
policy analyses: 
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1. Estimating the impact of fuel efficiency regulations and technologies on automobile 
ownership and use patterns (Goldberg 1998; Greene, et al. 1999; Small and Van 
Dender 2006); 
2. Analyzing the automobile demand and travel demand responses to gasoline price 
changes (Haughton and Sarkar 1996; Puller and Greening 1997); Bento, et al. 2005; 
Bomberg and Kockelman 2006);  
3. Assessing the overall and distributional effects of mileage-based vehicle pollution 
control policies and emissions taxes (Walls and Hanson 1999; West 2004); 
4. Estimating the benefits from mileage-based vehicle insurance (DeCorla-Souza 2001); 
5. Forecasting future demands for various types of automobiles (often conducted by 
automobile manufactures); 
6. Forecasting future automobile use, level of congestion, and mobile-source emission 
levels for land use development and transportation investment analysis (conducted by 
states and Metropolitan Planning Organizations).   
Earlier research on automobile demand (number and type) employed aggregate models 
developed from national or state-level time series data (Chow 1957; Kain and Beesley 1965; 
Mogridge 1967; Chamberlain 1974). Although aggregate demand models are useful in 
forecasting future aggregate vehicle shares by types, they ignore the impact of distinct 
household characteristics (e.g., income, size, location) on automobile demand, and do not 
consider individual households’ choices of vehicle ownership or use.  
Small and Van Dender (2006) have developed a simultaneous equation model (SEM) of 
vehicle fleet size, fuel efficiency, and vehicle use choices at the state level using a U.S. panel 
data set. Their model consists of three simultaneous regression equations (i.e., the dependent 
variable in one equation is also the independent variable in one or more other equations, 
allowing simultaneous or two-way influences); it is used to estimate the rebound effect of 
fuel efficiency standards. Their SEM model could be adapted to conduct household-level 
vehicle ownership and use analysis under certain assumptions.   
A disaggregate modeling paradigm is necessary for this project because of the project focus 
on the distributional effects at the household level. Therefore, aggregate demand models that 
group households by large spatial analysis units (e.g., cities, states, nations) were not further 
reviewed by the research team. 
Discrete choice models enable a disaggregate level of analysis and have dominated recent 
vehicle ownership studies (i.e., studies on the number and type of vehicles chosen by 
individual households). The majority of vehicle ownership models rely on multinomial, 
ordered, or nested logit specifications. Various vehicle ownership indicators have been 
estimated by the discrete choice models, including the following:  
• the choice of the most recent vehicle purchased (Lave and Train 1979; Kitamura, et al. 
2000);  
• the make, model, and vintage of the household vehicle holdings (Manski and Sherman 
1980);  
• the vehicle that is most driven (Choo and Mokhtarian 2004);  
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• the joint choice of vehicle number/make/model/vintage (Berkovec 1985); 
• the joint choice of vehicle make/model/vintage and vehicle acquisition type (Mannering, 
et al. 2002); and  
• the joint choice of vehicle type and vehicle age (Berkovec and Rust 1985; 
Mohammadian, et al. 2003).  
 
Bhat and Pulugurta (1998) compared a multinomial logit model to an ordered logit model 
when estimating a household’s total number of vehicles owned, and they found that the 
multinomial logit model had better performance. The significant explanatory variables used 
in these vehicle ownership models were reviewed by Choo and Mokhtarian (2004) including 
vehicle price, vehicle operating and maintenance cost, fuel cost, household size, income, 
household composition (numbers of workers, adults, children, etc.), location, residential 
density, transit accessibility, household head’s characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.), 
and vehicle characteristics (fuel efficiency, passenger/cargo capacity, head room, shoulder 
room, etc.).  Given the complexity of these models, they required an extensive data base to 
provide robust results. 
Vehicle use, measured by vehicle miles traveled (VMT), is frequently analyzed with 
regression models. Most of these regression models are developed for household-level 
analysis, with annual household VMT being the dependent variable, and with fuel cost, 
household socio-demographic factors, and vehicle characteristics being the explanatory 
variables (Mannering and Winston 1985; Train 1986; Bhat and Sen 2004; West 2004). 
Greene, et al. (1999) developed a vehicle-level VMT model for households with multiple 
vehicles. Their model estimates the use of a particular vehicle as a function of the use of other 
vehicles owned by the same household. This model specification considers the possibility 
that a household may drive a specific vehicle more when the relative driving costs of 
individual household vehicles change due to exogenous factors. For instance, when fuel cost 
increases, a household that owns a car and a truck may choose to use the car more often to 
reduce the total household fuel expenditure. Mannering and Winston (1985) show empirically 
that the elasticity of household VMT with respect to fuel cost per mile is significantly higher 
(in terms of the absolute value) for one-vehicle households than for multiple-vehicle 
households, which suggests that there is substitution among multiple household vehicles .     
It is important for vehicle ownership and use studies to recognize that households choose 
jointly the number of vehicles to own, the type of each household vehicle, and the amount 
each vehicle is driven. Households that expect to have high levels of vehicle use are more 
likely to own multiple vehicles and more likely to own fuel efficient vehicles. Households’ 
vehicle number and type choices in turn constrain day-to-day vehicle use decisions. As 
households choose to own more vehicles, the variety-seeking behavior in vehicle type 
choices also becomes more apparent. Therefore, instead of estimating vehicle ownership and 
vehicle use separately, more advanced models should jointly consider the discrete vehicle 
ownership choices and the continuous vehicle use choices.  
Most previous joint vehicle ownership and use models are variants of the discrete-continuous 
choice model developed by Dubin and McFadden (1984). Originally, the discrete-continuous 
choice model was used to simultaneously estimate the demand for and the usage of electrical 
appliances. The model is derived from a single indirect utility function and thus enjoys a solid 
microeconomic theoretical foundation. Those who have subsequently applied the Dubin and 
McFadden approach for estimating vehicle ownership and use include Mannering and 
Winston (1985), Train (1986), Berkowitxz(1990), Hensher, et al. (1992), Goldberg (1998), 
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West (2004), and Bento, et al. (2005). In these joint choice models, the discrete vehicle 
number choices (no vehicle, one vehicle, two vehicles, etc.) and type choices (car, SUV, 
minivan, pickup truck, etc.) are considered with multinomial logit or nested logit 
specifications, and the continuous vehicle use choices (vehicle miles driven) are modeled 
with regression equations.  
The discrete-continuous model specification allows each of the three vehicle-related choice 
dimensions (number, type, and use) to influence the other two choice dimensions through 
hierarchical choice structures, inclusive values, and correction terms. Mannering and Hensher 
(1987) note that full-information maximum likelihood estimation should produce unbiased 
coefficient estimates for discrete-continuous choice models simultaneously, while sequential 
estimation procedures are easier to implement in practice.   
Although the standard discrete-continuous choice model has a strong behavioral foundation 
and good policy sensitivity, Bhat and Sen (2004) have documented several theoretical and 
practical issues associated with the previous discrete-continuous modeling approaches. First 
of all, these approaches do not recognize that households own a mixture of vehicle types to 
satisfy different functional needs (e.g., transporting people, transporting household goods, 
vacation travel). The diminishing marginal returns in using a single vehicle type cannot be 
handled by the standard vehicle-type discrete choice models.  They have also noted that due 
to the large number of different vehicle types, enumerating all possible vehicle type bundles a 
household may choose from can cause an explosion in the number of alternatives in the 
choice set (e.g., m vehicles, n makers, p models for each maker, and q vintages result in 
m·n·p·q vehicle bundles). This limitation makes it difficult in the analysis to include 
households owning more than two vehicles.  
Zhao and Kockelman (2000) and West (2004) also mention the problem of large choice sets. 
One remedy is to combine multiple vehicle bundles with small sample sizes into a single 
larger vehicle bundle, so that the total number of choice alternatives can be reduced and 
becomes more manageable. Finally, modeling the continuous dimension of vehicle use could 
be cumbersome in the standard discrete-continuous choice model because in theory a number 
of regression equations need to be individually specified and estimated for households with 
different vehicle number and type combinations. But it should be noted that West (2004) only 
estimated a one-size-fits-all vehicle use model for all households in her study, and that Train 
(1986) estimated two vehicle use models for households with one vehicle and two vehicles 
respectively. Their models appear to provide satisfactory statistical significance and 
reasonable forecasts.   
Recognizing the limitations of the standard discrete-continuous choice models, Bhat, et al. 
(2004) applied the multiple discrete-continuous extreme value (MDCEV) model to vehicle 
ownership and use research. The MDCEV model is still based on the canonical utility-
maximization theory, but considers the diminishing returns in owning and using multiple 
vehicles of the same type. It assumes that households maximize utility by jointly choosing the 
number of vehicles to own in each vehicle type category (car, SUV, minivan, truck), and the 
annual miles of use of each owned vehicle type. To enable the subsequent simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation, it is also assumed that the total household annual vehicle 
miles driven is fixed and given, which makes the MDCEV model, in its present form, more 
appropriate for estimating long-term household vehicle fleet changes than for short-term 
vehicle use changes. It is interesting to note that some empirical evidence suggests that 
households tend to respond to fuel cost changes by owning different types of vehicles instead 
of changing vehicle use (Small 1999).   
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Household vehicle ownership models have also been developed outside the discrete choice 
framework. Zhao and Kockelman (2000) proposed a multivariate negative binomial (MNB) 
model to investigate households’ distinctions in vehicle purchases among passenger cars, 
SUVs, pickups, and minivans. This model structure is capable of capturing unobserved 
heterogeneity across the vehicle ownership levels and is equivalent to a multinomial 
distribution of the combinations of vehicles owned, conditioned on a negative binomial of the 
total vehicles owned. The model has been successfully estimated with the 1995 National 
Personal Travel Survey data. Compared to standard discrete choice models, the MNB vehicle 
ownership model does not require the enumeration of all possible vehicle type bundles. 
However, the MNB model does not provide a direct welfare measure, and it is harder to 
integrate with continuous vehicle use models.  
2.3 RECOMMENDED MODELING APPROACHES 
The research team considered the following modeling approaches for this project (all at the 
household level):  
1. The static model which assumes no behavioral response; 
2. Multiple regression model of vehicle use with fixed vehicle ownership; 
3. Simultaneous equation model of vehicle fleet size, fuel efficiency, and vehicle use 
decisions; and 
4. Discrete-continuous choice model of joint vehicle number, type, and use choices. 
All of these approaches differ in their underlying behavioral assumptions, functional forms, 
data requirements, model capabilities, and policy sensitivity. However, only the latter three 
are capable of estimating demand responses to the conversion from the per-gallon fuel tax to 
a VMT fee. All of the models can be used to assess the impact of this policy change on 
individual households or household groups.  
Note that commercial truck trips will not be considered by any of these models.  The reason 
is that in the state of Oregon heavy trucks already pay a weight-mile tax and thus would not 
face any change in user fees as a result of the policy change being analyzed. 
The specification, estimation, validation, and implementation of the recommended models 
are discussed in detail in the following sections, as well as the methods for applying the 
model results to analyze the distributional effects of a VMT fee.  
2.3.1 The static model 
The static model assumes no behavioral changes by vehicle owners in response to the change 
in tax, which essentially assumes that the price elasticity of demand for miles is zero.  These 
measures are calculated assuming that all vehicle drivers drive exactly the same vehicles for 
exactly the same distances both before and after the change in tax structure.  Since this 
method ignores the demand responses that are likely to occur in response to the change in 
driving cost caused by a change to a VMT fee, these figures will overstate the projected 
impacts of the change in tax structure. 
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The first step is to calculate the total household expenditures on gasoline under the gasoline 
tax and then again under a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee. 
For the gasoline tax the number of miles driven by the household (MILES) is divided by the 
weighted average fuel efficiency for the household vehicles (average miles per gallon, MPG), 




MPG  (2-1) 
 
To get total expenditures (GASTOTEX) under the gasoline tax, the number of gallons 
(GALLONS) is multiplied by the average price paid for fuel (PGAS), where PGAS includes 
the current gasoline tax of 24 cents per gallon. 
 
 GASTOTEX = (PGAS)(GALLONS) (2-2) 
 
The calculation for total expenditures under a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee of 1.2 cents 
per mile is made by taking the current gas price (PGAS) and subtracting the 24 cents per 
gallon gasoline tax to get the net price of gasoline, NETPGAS: 
  
 NETPGAS= PGAS−0.24 (2-3) 
 
Then NETPGAS is multiplied by the number of gallons for the household (GALLONS), and 
the amount spent on the VMT fee is added in by multiplying 1.2 times the number of miles 
(MILES) driven: 
 
 VMTTOTEX = MILESGALLONSNETPGAS •+• 012.0  (2-4) 
 
The net change in household expenditures is the difference between household expenditures 
under the two tax regimes: 
 
 EXCHANGE=VMTTOTEX–GASTOTEX (2-5) 
 
A negative value for EXCHANGE indicates that the change to a VMT fee will reduce 
household expenditures on gasoline and road tax; a positive value indicates an increase in 
expenditures when switching to the VMT fee. 
The incidence of household expenditures on gasoline and tax is defined as a percent of 
household income (INCOME): 
For the gasoline tax: 
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GASTOTEX / INCOME 
 
For the VMT fee: 
VMTTOTEX / INCOME 
 






INCOME  (2-6) 
 






INCOME  (2-7) 
 
However, these two measures will yield very small numbers, as the tax totals alone are a very 
small percent of income.   
To derive an incidence measure for the aggregate of households in various groups (such as 
income or rural/urban groups), one simply aggregates relevant measure over households in 
the group.  So, for instance, a measure of the incidence of gasoline taxes by income group j, 








2.3.2 Multiple regression model (OLS regression) 
Without considering vehicle quantity and type choices, one can focus on the changes in the 
usage and relative usage of existing household vehicles due to a change to a VMT fee.  In the 
short run, vehicle use changes result from households adjusting trip frequencies, trip chains, 
destinations, modes, vehicle occupancies, and routes.  In the long run, location choices (e.g., 
relocation to areas closer to work/non-work destinations, or to areas with better transit 
services and bike/pedestrian-facilities) may also shift vehicle use patterns.  The total vehicle 
use at the household level, measured by the total annual vehicle miles driven on all vehicles, 
should be a function of the per-mile driving cost, income, location, current vehicle 
ownership, and other relevant household characteristics. The per-mile driving cost borne by a 
household contains vehicle depreciation cost, operating cost, maintenance cost, insurance 
cost, and fuel cost including all applicable taxes.  However, fuel cost per mile is the only cost 
variable included in the regression model, because the other cost components are influenced 
by vehicle quantity and type choices (assumed to be fixed in this case) and fuel cost per mile 
is the only cost component that will be affected by a change to a VMT fee.   
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The multiple regression model states that the total miles driven by a household (M) is a 
function of the fuel cost per mile (PM), household income (I), household location (U), number 
of vehicles currently owned by the household (V), and a vector of other household 
characteristics (HHM).  
 
 ( , , , , )MM f P I U V= MHH  (2-8) 
 
Fuel cost per mile for household vehicle v (PM,v) is determined by the fuel price without state 
gasoline tax (PF, $/gallon), vehicle fuel efficiency (E, miles per gallon), state gasoline tax 











If a household owns multiple vehicles, PM is defined as the weighted average of all household 
vehicles with the miles driven on individual vehicles (Mv) being the weights. 
 
 ,1





= •= ∑  (2-10) 
 
2.3.2.1 Model specification  
The model in Equation 2-8 can be specified as a simple linear regression model with 
total miles driven being the dependent variable. However, a log-log functional form 
has been shown to be superior in previous research and would allow easier 
computation of demand elasticities: 
 
   ( )
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6 7 8
ln ln ln ln ln
(ln ln ) (ln ln ) (ln ln ) ln
M
M M M
M P I U V
I P U P V P
β β β β β
β β β
= + + + +
+ • + • + • + • Mβ HH
 (2-11) 
where:  
ln(.) is the natural logarithm function,  
M is total household miles driven,  
I is household income,  
Pm is the weighted average household fuel cost per mile,  
U is the urban/rural location indicator,  
V is the number of vehicles in the household, and  
HH is a vector of household characteristics. 
 
Demand elasticity (e) is defined as the percentage change of total household vehicle 
miles driven due to a one percent increase of fuel cost per mile: 
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For instance, if e is equal to –1.5 for a particular household, it implies that a one 
percent increase in fuel cost per mile will cause this household to reduce their total 
annual miles driven by 1.5 percent. The three interaction terms (the 6th, 7th and 8th 
terms) on the right hand side of the regression equation allow the demand elasticity 
with respect to fuel cost per mile to vary among households with different income, 
location, and vehicle ownership. It is expected that households with higher income 
(low price elasticity in general), living in rural areas (fewer travel options and lower 
density land use patterns), and owning more vehicles (possible substitutions among 
multiple household vehicles) to be less sensitive to changes in fuel cost per mile and 
therefore have lower demand elasticities. Without the interaction terms in Equation 2-
11, all households in Oregon would be effectively assumed to have the same 
sensitivity to fuel cost changes, an obviously unreasonable assumption.  
Although household income and vehicle ownership data were readily available in 
various data sources, it was less straightforward to define household location. 
Decision makers in Oregon were interested in the potentially different impacts of the 
VMT fee on urban and rural households. However, the National Household Travel 
Survey (NHTS) dataset only provided a crude urban/rural indicator variable.  
Aside from income, location, and vehicle ownership, other household characteristics 
can also significantly affect total vehicle miles driven, including household size, 
household composition (number of workers, adults, children, etc.), and household 
head characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.). These socio-demographic variables 
were available to the research team, to be considered in subsequent model 
development stages.  
2.3.2.2 Model estimation and validation 
The multiple regression model was estimated from the NHTS data using ordinary 
least square techniques. After coefficients were empirically derived, the model-
estimated and observed household vehicle miles driven were compared for model 
validation purposes. It would be desirable to use an independent validation dataset; 
however, the NHTS 2001 dataset only included 348 valid household observations in 
Oregon. The research team addressed this issue of small sample size in two ways. 
First, a cluster analysis was conducted to identify states that had similar travel and 
vehicle ownership characteristics.  Second, a number of sensitivity tests were 
conducted on the estimated model to ensure the regression model produced 
reasonable forecasts. The validity of the regression model was tested by arbitrarily 
changing independent variables (fuel price, fuel efficiency, income, household size, 
etc.) and observing the estimated changes in the dependent variable (total vehicle 
miles driven).   
2.3.2.3 Model implementation and the distributional effects of a VMT fee 
A VMT fee would lead to a change of fuel cost per mile in the regression equation (2-
11) according to the definition of fuel cost per mile in Equation (2-9). The fuel cost 
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per mile with the existing gasoline tax is PM,Before=(PF+0.24)/E, and changes to 
PM,After=(0.012+PF/E) under a $0.012/mile flat-rate VMT fee. The total miles driven 
by any household in the sample before (MBefore) and after (MAfter) a change to a VMT 
fee can be computed from the regression model. The total fuel-related payment (F) 
and total road use fee payment (T) by each household would be: 
  
 ,Before M Before BeforeF P M= • ;        ,After M After BeforeF P M= •  (2-13) 
   
0.24
Before BeforeT ME
= •  ;          0.02After AfterT M= •    
 
These results at the individual household level can be easily aggregated into 
household groups by income, location, vehicle ownership, and other household 
characteristics, which can show the distributional impact of a $0.012/mile VMT fee 
on various types of households in Oregon. The distributional effects of graduated or 
variable VMT fee structures could be evaluated in a similar fashion, except that the 
changes in fuel cost per mile would depend on the actual rate structure. 
2.3.3 Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) 
The regression model discussed in Section 2.3.2 has several advantages. It is relatively easy 
to estimate, has minimum data requirements, and provides good policy sensitivity (i.e., is 
capable of evaluating various mile tax rate structures). However, the regression model makes 
the strong behavioral assumption that households would respond to a change to a VMT fee 
by changing vehicle use only. This assumption may not be as unrealistic as many might 
think, because the fuel cost changes due to a VMT fee are expected to be quite small. One 
could argue that vehicle purchase decisions are unlikely to be affected by small fuel cost 
changes. However, empirical evidence suggests that in responses to fuel price spikes, 
households often change their vehicle types rather than reduce their total vehicle use (Small 
1999, Kockelman 2006). Mannering and Winston (1985) find that the long-run vehicle use 
elasticity with respect to operating cost changes are significantly smaller than the short-run 
elasticity, also suggesting vehicle ownership changes.  
The simultaneous equation model presented in this section recognizes that households choose 
the number of vehicles to own (V), the average fuel efficiency of household vehicles (E), and 
the total vehicle miles driven (M) simultaneously (i.e., the three choices are interdependent) 
when fuel cost per mile changes. The actual model identification is provided in Equation Set 
2-14.  To capture the interdependencies of vehicle ownership and use decisions, these three 
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HH  (2-14) 
Vehicle number choice (V) is a function of vehicle use (M), average purchase price of 
vehicles (PV), fuel price (PF), household income (I), location (U), and other household 
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characteristics (HHV, e.g., number of workers, household size, number of children, household 
head’s age, gender, and education). Vehicle fuel efficiency (E) is a function of vehicle use 
(M), number of vehicles (V), difference in the purchase price of fuel efficient and fuel 
inefficient vehicles (ΔPV), price of fuel (PF), income (I), location (U), and other household 
characteristics (HHE; a different subscript is used because it is possible that a different set of 
other household characteristics may influence vehicle fuel efficiency choices). Finally, 
vehicle miles driven (M) is a function of the number of household vehicles (V) and fuel cost 
per mile (PM), which is a function of fuel price and fuel efficiency, income (I), location (U), 
and other household characteristics (HHM).  
The actual specification of each of the three functions is similar to the log-log specification in 
Equation 2-11 in Section 2.3.2. Again, the income, location, and vehicle quantity variables 
were interacted with fuel cost variables to allow different demand elasticities across 
households. Compared to the multiple regression model, the SEM model required additional 
information about vehicle price, which was collected by the research team from standard 
vehicle price database and the 2001 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (Wards 2001).  
 In order to apply standard estimation procedures for SEM models such as the three-stage 
least square method, it is necessary to consider vehicle quantity as a continuous variable. The 
estimated vehicle quantity will be rounded into the nearest integer values. This rounding 
process will not affect the validity of the vehicle type and use forecasts. Similar to the 
regression model in Section 2.3.2, the SEM model will produce estimates of household 
vehicle miles driven before and after a change to a VMT fee. However, the SEM estimates 
represent the long-run vehicle use adjustment with vehicle quantity and type changes already 
taken into account, while the regression model estimates represent the short-run vehicle use 
changes with fixed vehicle quantity and type. The SEM estimates, therefore, can be expected 
to be smaller than the regression mode estimates. In other words, if a VMT fee has a negative 
impact on a particular household, the negative impact will be overestimated by the regression 
model.    
Among the software packages that are capable of estimating SEM models, the research team 
chose STATA. 
2.3.4 Discrete-Continuous Choice (DCC) Model 
Discrete choice models or qualitative choice models predict the decisions made by an 
individual (vehicle ownership choice, mode choice, vehicle use, etc.) as a function of a 
number of factors which seem to influence the decision making process. The individual is 
presumed to have made the choice from a discrete set.  Discrete choice models are widely 
used to predict the mode choice of individuals in transportation modeling. The most 
prominent discrete choice models used currently include logit, generalized extreme value, 
probit, and mixed logit. These models can effectively analyze the variables which are not 
continuous but still vary over time. Regression models on the other hand can effectively 
analyze the continuous variables. 
When an individual is provided with two qualitative choices such as the number of cars to 
own or the number of miles to drive, the first choice is between a discrete set of alternatives 
say 0, 1 or 2.  The second choice is among a continuous set of alternatives such as any 
number of miles. A discrete choice model can be used to estimate the first choice but cannot 
estimate the second one. Thus, in most of the studies which have used this approach the 
vehicle number choice was estimated using a discrete choice model and then vehicle use 
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(miles traveled) was estimated using linear regression. In this case we need both a discrete 
and continuous model to (Train 1993). Hence, a combination of these two models known as 
the discrete-continuous choice model can be used here. 
The discrete-continuous choice model was introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984) when 
they suggested that, in order to estimate the demand for electricity, a derived demand, one has 
to simultaneously estimate the demand for the durables that ultimately drive the demand for 
energy. 
Sarah E. West (2001) used this approach to examine the distributional effects of vehicle 
pollution control policies by estimating the joint demand for vehicles and miles. Train (1993) 
estimated the demand for cars and light trucks while taking into account the interdependence 
between the number of vehicles a household chooses to own and the type chosen. 
Mohammadian and Miller (2003) developed a household automobile type choice model at a 
disaggregate level to estimate the consumer demand for personal-use vehicles given the 
available choices. Mannering and Winston (1985) used this approach to analyze the impact of 
vehicle ownership on the utilization. Other people who have used this approach include Lave 
and Train (1979)  and Berkowitz (1990). 
The simultaneous equation model (SEM) relies on more realistic behavioral assumptions than 
the multiple regression model. The SEM model requires, however, that vehicle quantity be 
considered as a continuous variable. The fact is that vehicle quantities are indeed discrete 
integer variables (0, 1, 2, 3 …), and the discrete-continuous choice (DCC) model is able to 
deal with these variables.  The drawback is that it also has increased data requirements and 
involves greater model complexity. The following sections describe the discrete and the 
continuous components in a standard DCC model. 
2.3.4.1 Discrete choices of vehicle quantity and type 
Vehicle quantity (V: 0, 1, 2, 3 …) and vehicle type (T: car, SUV, minivan, pickup 
truck) are both discrete variables in the DCC model. A household chooses how many 
cars to own (V) based on the expected vehicle use ( M ), the average vehicle price on 
the market (PV), fuel price (PF), income (I), location (U), and other household 
characteristics (HHV). If a household chooses to own only one vehicle, the household 
then needs to choose the vehicle type (T) from the four available types based on the 
average price of vehicles by type (PV,T), the average fuel cost per mile by vehicle type 
(PM,T), income (I), location (U), and other household characteristics (HHT), as shown 
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HH  (2-15) 
 
If a household chooses to own multiple vehicles, T should be interpreted as vehicle 
bundles (e.g. car-car, car-SUV, car-minivan-pickup). The number of possible vehicle 
bundles increases exponentially as the number of household vehicles increases. This 
issue can be partially addressed by excluding households with more than three 
vehicles from the analysis and by combining vehicle bundles with few observations 
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into larger bundles. (Excluding households with more than three vehicles would result 
in only a small loss in the total number of observations, according to the NHTS 2001 
Oregon sample.) 
Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variables, these two functions can be 
specified either as two interrelated multinomial logit models, or as a single nested 
logit model. Standard statistical tests (Dubin and McFadden 1984; Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman 1985) can facilitate the selection between the two alternative specifications. 
ΡV is either a correction term (if quantity and type choices are specified as non-nested 
choices) or the inclusive value from the lower-level vehicle type choice nest (if 
quantity and type choices are specified as nested choices). ΡT is a correction term that 
considers the different numbers of make/models in alternative vehicle bundles. (e.g., 
there are more car models than minivan models, and therefore, all other things equal, 
households are more likely to purchase a car due to the large selection). The 
correction terms can be computed by an approximation method developed in 
McFadden (1978). 
 Multinomial and nested logit models can be estimated by several commercial 
software packages including LIMDEP and GAUSS. The research team preferred 
LIMDEP due to its low cost ($795 for an academic license) and its special focus on 
models of categorical variables.   
2.3.4.2 Continuous choice of vehicle use 
Given the choices of vehicle quantity and vehicle types, households then choose how 
many miles to drive in each vehicle. The simplest approach is to estimate a single 
multiple regression model of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) at the household level 
(West 2004), i.e., a household-level VMT use model. Another approach is to estimate 
vehicle miles driven at the individual vehicle level for households with different 
numbers of vehicles separately (Train 1986), i.e., a vehicle-level VMT model.  The 
specification of the household-level vehicle use model is similar to the regression 
model in Section 2.3.2:   
 
 ( , ) ( , ) ,( , , , , , )V T M V T V TM f P I U V ρ= MHH  (2-16) 
 
The subscript (V,T) implies that the variables are conditional on the vehicle quantity 
and type choices in the discrete choice model. A correction term, ρV,T, is necessary to 
ensure the consistency of coefficient estimates, because the random error term in the 
vehicle use equation is expected to be correlated with vehicle type choices.  This 
correction term can be computed using choice probabilities from the vehicle quantity 
and type choice models (Dubin and McFadden 1984).  
If a household chooses not to own automobiles, a vehicle use model is obviously not 
needed. If a household owns one vehicle, the household- and vehicle-level VMT 
models are equivalent. For households choosing to own multiple vehicles, there exist 
substitutional effects between household vehicles, which may be better captured by 
vehicle-level VMT models. For instance, a fuel price increase can make the fuel-
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efficient vehicle in a multiple-vehicle household more attractive, and subsequently 
driven more, while the use of other household vehicles decreases.  
Let i and j denote vehicles in a household. The miles driven on vehicle i should be a 
function of the fuel cost per mile of vehicle i, and the fuel cost per mile of all other 
household vehicles (For all j ≠ i):  
 
 ,( , , , )i M iM h P I U= M,j, MP HH  (2-17) 
 
The estimation, validation, and implementation procedures for the vehicle-level VMT 
model are the same as those for the household-level VMT models.  
2.3.4.3 Using the Discrete-Continuous Choice Model for policy analysis 
The DCC model estimates the probability that a household would choose to own a 
specific number of vehicles (p(v)), and conditional on the vehicle quantity choice, the 
probability that the household chooses to own a particular vehicle type bundle (p(t|v)), 
and conditional on vehicle quantity and type choices, the vehicle miles driven by the 
household in each vehicle (Mi|t,v). Therefore, the expected total miles driven by the 
household (M) according to the DCC model is: 
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The distributional effects of a VMT fee can then be estimated. The subsequent steps 
for policy analysis are similar to those of the original regression model in Section 
2.3.2.   
2.4 SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDED MODELING 
APPROACHES  
Table 2.1 summarizes the properties of the recommended modeling approaches in three 
categories: behavioral realism, policy sensitivity, and practicality. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of the recommended models 
RECOMMENDED MODELS 










1. Behavioral Realism Poor Average Good Great 
1.1. Consider changes in total vehicle use? No Yes Yes Yes 
1.2. Consider changes in the distribution of 
vehicle uses among multiple vehicles?  No 
Yes Yes Yes 
1.3. Consider changes in vehicle quantity choice? No No Yes Yes 
1.4. Consider changes in vehicle type choice? No No Yes Yes 
1.5. Recognize the discrete nature of vehicle type 
and quantity choices? No 
No No Yes 
2. Policy Sensitivity Good Good Average Good 
2.1. Consider the distributional effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2.2. Able to evaluate flat-rate mileage taxes? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2.3 Able to evaluate mileage tax rates 
differentiated based on location? Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
2.4. Able to evaluate mileage tax rates 
differentiated based on fuel efficiency? Yes 
Yes No Yes 
2.5. Able to evaluate mileage tax rates 
differentiated based on congestion? No 
No No No 
3. Practicality  Great Great Good Average 
3.1 Data Availability Good Good Good Poor 
3.2 Ease of Estimation Great Great Good Average 




The 2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) was the main data source for this 
study.  This survey was conducted by the United States Department of Transportation and the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  
Within the NHTS data set, there were five files: household, vehicle, persons, daily trips and 
long trips.  All of the variables used in the empirical estimation for the modeling came from 
the household and vehicle files. For Oregon the number of observations for each of these files 
in 2001 is shown in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Oregon sample from 2001 NHTS 
 Number Of Observations 
File Total Urban Rural 
Household 407 295 112 
Vehicle 893 588 305 
 
Although there were 407 Oregon households in the NHTS, the number of households 
included in each part of the analysis for this study varied depending on whether every 
household had complete data for the model.  When a household did not have a complete data 
set, it was dropped from that part of the analysis. 
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES USED 
3.1.1 Urban/rural  
Urban and rural indicators in the NHTS are based on Census classifications. According to the 
Census, urban is defined as having more than 1,000 people per square mile in their city or 
town and more than 500 people per square mile in surrounding areas.  All other areas are 
defined as rural.  The models used an urban/rural dummy variable with a value of one when 
the household was located in an urban area, zero otherwise. 
3.1.2 Household income and income groups  
There are two variables in the NHTS that refer to household income - HHFAMINC and 
HHINCTTL.  The former leaves blank those household members whose income was not 
stated.  HHINCTTL randomly assigns those blanks a value within the range of those 
household members whose income was recorded.  This study used HHFAMINC to create the 
household income variable.  This income variable therefore likely understated the true 
household income value for some households.   
Since each household only indicated an income range rather than a level of income, this study 
assigned each household the median income value for their income group.  This approach 
was not optimal, but it was all that could be done with the data, and it followed others who 
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have used similar data sets with similar measures of income (Zupnick 1978; Lee 2000).  For 
the exact methodology used in assigning income to individual households, see Appendix A. 
Table 3.2 below compares the distribution of incomes groups in both the Census and the 
NHTS data set. Eight groups are listed here to give a better illustration of the actual 
distribution relative to the Census.  From these categories, this study divided the NHTS 
sample into the six income groups for the analysis. 
 
    Table 3.2: Sample representation as compared to the Oregon Census 2000 
Income Range ($) % of Sample – Census 
% of Sample - 
NHTS 
<10,000 8.6 5.17 
10,000~14,999 6.5 6.55 
15,000~24,999 13.4 14.83 
25,000~34,999 13.9 13.10 
35,000~49,999 17.7 21.72 
50,000~74,999 20.2 18.62 
75,000~99,999 9.7 12.41 
100,000+ 10 3.10 
 
The highest income group is defined as a household with income greater than or equal to 
$100,000.  The Oregon 2000 Census reported that only 1.8% of all Oregon households had an 
income greater than $200,000 (with no upper bound).  Thus, this study used $200,000 as an 
upper bound for the highest income group and assigned these households a household income 
value of $150,000.   
Previous studies on VMT demand suggest using household expenditures in place of income 
as a measure of well-being (West 2002; Walls and Hansen 1999). However, household 
expenditure data was not available  
3.1.3 Fuel cost per mile 
The 2001 NHTS provides an estimated gas price for each vehicle.  However, these prices, 
which are based on the fuel type as indicated by the household and on gasoline price data 
collected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), produce a relatively uniform 
distribution, ranging from approximately $1.41 to $1.47 per gallon, with the majority of 
households spending approximately $1.46 per gallon (Energy Information Administration 
2003).  Detailed gas prices are available from various sources, one of them being the Oil 
Price Information Service (OPIS).  It would be possible to get prices from different cities or 
counties within Oregon on a weekly, monthly or annual basis.  Unfortunately, the NHTS data 
does not include a location indicator; so the study could not match gas prices to individual 
household locations.  Thus, the analysis assumed that Oregon households faced an average 
retail price for gas of $1.46 in 2001, which included the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax. 
The gas price per gallon was divided by fuel efficiency, to obtain the fuel cost per mile for 
each vehicle in a household.  The household fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax was 
calculated by taking the mile-weighted average of gasoline cost per mile for all household 
vehicles. 
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The NHTS provides two fuel efficiency estimates - the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) estimate and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimate.  Rather than 
using the EPA fuel efficiency estimates, which are known to be overstated, this analysis used 
the EIA fuel efficiency measures.  For the state of Oregon, the average fuel efficiency was 
20.75 – 21.23 miles per gallon for vehicles in urban areas, and 19.78 miles per gallon for 
vehicles in rural areas.  At a fuel efficiency of 20 miles per gallon a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT 
fee would be equivalent to the current 24 cents per gallon gasoline tax.  Thus, on average, 
rural households would pay slightly less in road user fees per mile than their urban 
counterparts after a conversion to a VMT fee. 
To calculate the fuel cost per mile under the VMT fee, the state gasoline tax (24 cents per 
gallon for Oregon) was subtracted from the gas price; the net gas cost was then divided by the 
fuel efficiency for each vehicle, the per-mile fee was added; and then a weighted average was 
calculated.  (See Table A.2 in Appendix A for more details.) 
3.1.4 Mileage measures 
Self-reported annual miles for each vehicle were used for this study.  Household miles were 
therefore the sum of all individual vehicle miles for all household vehicles.   
3.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR OREGON  
The summary statistics for the most part were consistent with previous studies.  
According to the Oregon data observations from the 2001 NHTS data used in this study, the 
average household in Oregon owned 2.19 vehicles.  Urban households owned an average of 
1.99 vehicles, while rural households owned 2.72 vehicles on average. 
The households were initially placed into one of 18 income groups.1  The average household 
income group for the NHTS sample was 9.26, implying an average household income of 
slightly above $44,999 (since the upper bound household income in Group 9 was $44,999).   
Surprisingly, the average rural household income group – 9.38 – was higher than the urban 
group (9.23), a finding somewhat counter to conventional wisdom.  One possible explanation 
for the apparent higher average income for rural households was that there tended to be more 
members in the rural households (2.49), than in the urban households (2.43).  The average 
household size for Oregon was 2.44 members per household. 
A more likely explanation for this unexpected result comes from the definition of urban and 
rural households adopted by the NHTS in placing households in one of the two groups.  The 
NHTS uses the Census Bureau definition which classifies a place as “urban” using a complex 
algorithm involving population size (2,500 or more) and population density (500 per square 
mile or more); all other places are identified as “rural”. The Census definition overstates rural 
areas by counting as rural many small areas that have strong ties to urban areas. The people in 
those areas classified as “rural” may well have much higher incomes than those in what 
would be considered rural Oregon by state policy makers (Crandall and Weber 2005).   
                                                 
1 Due to the relatively small number of Oregon households in the NHTS sample, there were very few 
households in some of the 18 income groups.  Thus for the analysis the Oregon households were organized into 
six income groups so as to provide a reasonable number of households in each category. 
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Crandall and Weber (2005) argue that the Census definition of urban and rural may not be 
ideal, because it fails to incorporate the fact that areas around urban or metropolitan cities, 
which are ‘rural’ according to the Census, still have full access to urban transportation 
systems and other services that truly isolated areas may not have access to.  Instead, they 
propose an alternative definition that incorporates location relative to large cities and whether 
or not there are linkages to those cities.  Such a classification system would more accurately 
model a household's access to transportation and employment opportunities.  Unfortunately, 
the NHTS does not provide the households’ city or county location.  The NHTS does include 
data on population density at the block and tract level; however, households are assigned to 
one of eight categories, and this variable was therefore not viewed as an accurate measure. 
The average vehicle in Oregon was driven 8,859.39 miles in 2001.  The average vehicle in 
urban areas was driven 8,796.01 miles, compared to 8,989.71 miles in rural areas. 
The average household member in Oregon drove 15.01 miles to work in 2001.  The average 
household member in an urban area drove 13.75 miles, while the average household member 
in a rural area drove 18.46 miles to work.  
The average vehicle age for Oregon was 11.40 years. On average, vehicles in rural areas 
tended to be slightly older than those in urban areas – 12.02 years in rural areas and 11.08 
years in urban areas. 
As expected, car choice appeared to vary by location.  As seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, a larger 
proportion in urban areas owned automobiles, vans, and smaller vehicles than in rural areas.  
Those in rural areas were more likely to own trucks.   
 
Table 3.3: Number of Vehicles by Type and Location: Urban/Rural 
 Number Of Vehicles 
 Car Van SUV Truck R.V. Motorcycle Other Total 
Urban 297 44 79 123 12 27 4 586 
Rural 113 16 40 112 5 10 9 305 
Source: 2001 NHTS data for Oregon     
 
Table 3.4: Percent of Vehicles by Type and Location: Urban/Rural 
 Number Of Vehicles 
 Car Van SUV Truck R.V. Motorcycle Other 
Urban 0.507 0.075 0.135 0.210 0.020 0.046 0.007 
Rural 0.370 0.052 0.131 0.367 0.016 0.033 0.030 
Source: 2001 NHTS data for Oregon 
 
Thus, given the vehicle mix in urban versus rural Oregon, it was not clear that the rural part 
of the state would be adversely impacted overall by a change to a VMT fee.  Rural drivers 
appeared to be driving less fuel efficient vehicles, on average, and those are the ones that 
would actually experience a decrease in per mile road taxes under a VMT fee. 
On average, households in this analysis held on to their vehicles for twelve years in rural 
areas and eleven years in urban areas, a few more years than other estimates (Barnes and 
Langworthy 2003). 
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The NHTS sample included 407 Oregon households with a total of 893 vehicles.  From this 
sample, the authors assigned weighted averages based on vehicle miles for fuel efficiency and 
fuel cost per mile.  If a household was missing fuel efficiency for one or multiple vehicles, 
that vehicle was assigned the average of the household's remaining vehicles’ fuel efficiency.  
If fuel price was missing, the missing value was assigned the sample average, since there was 
a relatively uniform distribution of prices. 
If annual miles were not reported, or were reported as missing in the sample, it was assumed 
that the vehicle was not used in that year, and these vehicles were ignored.  Thus, these 
vehicles were also excluded in the household vehicle count.  For example, if a household 
reportedly owned four vehicles, but reported zero miles for one vehicle, the vehicle count was 
readjusted to three.  Furthermore, recreational vehicles were also ignored, and households’ 
vehicle counts were again adjusted accordingly.  All of the other data used in this analysis 
were from the NHTS data set.  
After these adjustments, if a household was missing any of the variables included in the 
analysis, the household was excluded.  For the static model analysis this resulted in a sample 
of 367 households. The additional data required for the OLS regression reduced the sample to 
339 Oregon households.   
3.3 AN EXPANDED DATA SET 
The discrete-continuous choice (DCC) model requires substantially more data than the static 
model or the regression models.  This requirement resulted in a significant reduction in the 
number of usable households from the Oregon sample, and such a small sample size would 
have prevented the analysis from producing meaningful results.  Thus, an attempt was made 
to expand the data set for the DCC model by utilizing households from other comparable 
states.  The authors used cluster analysis to identify states that had characteristics most 
similar to Oregon for the additional households in this expanded analysis. 
The cluster analysis used a table with 51 observations (50 states and the District of Columbia) 
and 39 variables. The available variables were narrowed down to a list of 17, with some 
derived from the original 39.  The cluster analysis applied a mathematical algorithm to find 
the states most similar to Oregon with respect to these variables.  For example, as Oregon had 
a very high rural population, the cluster analysis separated states with high or low rural 
populations while accounting for other variables, such as personal income, total population 
and total miles driven per capita in rural or urban areas.  Table 3.5 shows the variables chosen 
for use in the cluster analysis 
The data used in this cluster analysis were from the Federal Highway Administration’s 
(FHWA) Highway Statistics, an annual summary of various highway statistics for each state 
and the District of Columbia (FHWA 2002).  To coincide with the 2001 NHTS data set, the 
analysis used the 2001 highway statistics.  Although there were several tables available for 
each year, the data was drawn from the ‘Selected Measures for Peer State’ table. 
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Table 3.5: List of Variables Used in Cluster Analysis 
Variable Name Measures 
Urban Lane Miles Divided by Total Lane Miles Urban road proportion 
Rural VMT Divided by Rural Lane Miles Proxy for rural congestion 
Urban VMT Divided by Urban Lane Miles Proxy for urban congestion 
Rural Lane Mi. Divided by Total Rural Land Sq.Mi. Rural road density 
Urban Lane Mi. Divided by Total Urban Land Sq.Mi Urban road density 
Urban Land Sq.Mi. Divided by Total Land Sq.Mi. Urban land proportion 
Rural Population Divided by Rural Land Sq.Mi. Rural population density 
Urban Population Divided by Urban Land Sq.Mi. Urban population density 
Total Population Per Square Mile Total population density 
Urban Population Divided by Total Population Urban population proportion 
Personal Income Per Capita  
Personal Gross State Product Per Capita  
Percent of Total VMT Driven by Trucks in Rural Areas  
Percent of Total VMT Driven by Trucks in Urban Areas  
Rural VMT Divided by Rural Population Rural VMT per capita 
Urban VMT Divided by Urban Population Urban VMT per capita 
Total VMT Per Capita Per capita VMT for state 
Source: FHWA Highway Statistics 2001 (http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs01/index.htm) 
 
The STATA Data Analysis and Statistical Software was used to run a hierarchical clustering 
based on complete linkages.  This method is appropriate when non-chaining similarities exist 
and when the number of total groups is not clear.  Each value first had to be transformed into 
Z-scores to account for the fact that the variables are measured in different units.  For 
example, it would be inaccurate to compare a proportion (such as the urban proportion of 
total lane miles) and personal income per capita as measured in dollars.  There were several 
ways to standardize the data.  The authors chose to use the following method:  
 
 Xnew= (Xold-Xmean)/XStDev (3-1) 
 
where  
Xnew was the standardized value,  
Xold was the original value,  
Xmean was the variable’s mean, and  
XStDev was the standard deviation of the variable.   
 
Based on this analysis the state found to be most similar to Oregon was Nebraska, followed 
by Wisconsin.  Other states found to be similar to Oregon included Colorado, Washington, 
Michigan, Virginia, Minnesota, Texas, Utah, and Oklahoma. The complete results are shown 
in Figure 3.1.  Texas and Wisconsin (referred to as “add-on states”) elected to have larger 
samples drawn for the 2001 NHTS and were therefore over-represented; thus they were 
excluded. The 2001 NHTS survey did not provide enough observations in Nebraska or 
Oklahoma, so these were also excluded from the analysis. The remaining six states that 
showed similar travel patterns as Oregon are listed in Table 3.6, as well as the number of 
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Figure 3.1: Cluster analysis results 
Table 3.6: Added observations from the NHTS as a result of the cluster analysis 











4.0 STATIC MODEL RESULTS 
In the Oregon 2001 NHTS data set, the average gasoline price paid per gallon was $1.46, 
which included the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax.  Thus, the average price of gasoline net 
of the gasoline tax was $1.22.    To update the results to a more realistic gasoline price, the 
authors later did the same calculations using a price of $2.64 per gallon ($2.40 per gallon net 
of the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax.) 
Of interest was how a change from the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax to a 1.2 cents per mile 
VMT fee would affect the per-mile total gasoline costs for vehicles with different fuel 
efficiencies.  Vehicles that achieved less than 20 miles per gallon would pay less under the 
VMT fee, while those that got over 20 miles per gallon would pay more.   
Given that the NHTS Oregon data sample exhibited an average fuel efficiency of 20.75 miles 
per gallon, if all vehicles were driven the same number of miles, one would expect a decrease 
in expenditures on road use after a change to a VMT fee.  The actual impact would depend on 
the relative number of miles driven by vehicles of differing fuel efficiencies.  The net change 
in expenditures and incidence, based on location and assuming a net fuel cost of $1.22, was 
calculated excluding households with missing fuel efficiency data. 
West (2005) reports that incidence is less regressive if all households are included, not just 
those that have vehicles.  This result suggests that in West’s sample zero vehicle households 
were more frequent in the lower income classes. There were 32 households in the Oregon 
NHTS sample with zero vehicles. Nineteen households reported that they owned zero 
vehicles, while thirteen households were assigned a value of zero for the number of vehicles, 
because they either did not report annual miles for all vehicles or they reported zero miles for 
all vehicles. As seen in Table 4.1, households with zero vehicles were overwhelmingly urban 
households, and they also appeared to be those in the lower income groups (less than $29,999 
annual household income). 
   
Table 4.1: Characteristics of households with zero vehicles 
 Number of Households 
with Zero Vehicles 
Urban with zero vehicles 29 
Rural with zero vehicles 3 
Household head – Male 16 
Household head – Female 16 
Income Group 1 ($0~$14,999) 13 
Income Group 2 ($15,000~$29,999) 10 
Income Group 3 ($30,000~44,999) 4 
Income Group 4 ($45,000~59,999) 2 
Income Group 5 ($60,000~74,999) 2 
Income Group 6 ($75,000~$200,000) 0 
Missing Income Group 1 
  
The results for urban and rural vehicle expenditures under the two fee structures (gas tax and 
VMT fee), both including and excluding households with zero vehicles is shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Change in average annual household expenditures when switching from the gasoline tax to a 
VMT fee by location 
Including Households with Zero Vehicles 
 #HHs 
Average Gas Tax 
Expenditures 
Average VMT Fee 
Expenditures 
Net Change in 
Expenditure 
Urban 286 $1,122.85 $1,122.31 - $  0.53 
Rural 111 $1,556.92 $1,543.68 - $13.24 
Excluding Households with Zero Vehicles 
 #HHs 
Average Gas Tax 
Expenditures 
Average VMT Fee 
Expenditures 
Net Change in 
Expenditure 
Urban 258 $1,188.11 $1,188.02 - $  0.09 
Rural 108 $1,456.18 $1,438.49 - $17.69 
 
The results show that the change from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee would have the net 
result of reducing average expenditures for all households.   However, the average savings 
from the conversion would be greater for the average rural household than for the average 
urban household.  This is probably attributable to the fact that on average rural households 
drove vehicles with lower miles per gallon than those in urban areas.  However, the average 
rural household in the sample also drove more miles than the average urban household.  
Obviously, the change in average household expenditures was less when including those 
households that had zero vehicles, a result demonstrated in the table. 
The impact on household gasoline and tax expenditures by income group, both including and 
excluding zero vehicle households, is shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Change in average annual household expenditures when switching from the gasoline tax to a 
VMT fee by income group 
Including Households with Zero Vehicles 
Income Group #HHs 
Average Gas Tax 
Expenditures 




$0-$14,999 52 $     494.18 $     500.04 $   5.86 
$15,000~$29,999 85 $     809.86 $     814.44 $   4.58 
$30,000~44,999 69 $  1,105.95 $  1,101.81 - $   4.14 
$45,000~59,999 64 $  1,545.26 $  1,545.48 $   0.22 
$60,000~74,999 42 $  1,770.33 $  1,746.20 - $ 24.13 
$75,000~$200,000 67 $  1,992.60 $  1,986.59 - $   6.00 
Excluding Households with Zero Vehicles 
Income Group #HHs 
Average Gas Tax 
Expenditures 




$0-$14,999 39 $     658.90 $     666.72 $    7.81 
$15,000~$29,999 75 $     917.84 $     923.03 $    5.19 
$30,000~44,999 65 $  1,174.01 $  1,169.61 - $    4.40 
$45,000~59,999 62 $  1,595.10 $  1,595.33 $    0.23 
$60,000~74,999 40 $  1,858.85 $  1,833.51 - $  25.34 
$75,000~$200,000 67 $  1,992.60 $  1,986.59 - $    6.00 
 
As explained above, including households with zero vehicles resulted in smaller average 
gasoline expenditures and thus less impact on average gasoline expenditures.  This is because 
37 
households with zero vehicles would not be at all affected by a change in tax structure, 
because they would not spend anything on gasoline in either case.   Thus, it would appear that 
the relevant changes to examine are those from the sample that does not include zero-vehicle 
households. 
Table 4.3 shows that, on average, those in the lowest income group would pay $7.81 more 
per year in gasoline expenditures under a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee, and the second lowest 
income group would pay an additional $5.19 per year.  The group with the highest average 
benefit from the change would be the $60,000-$74,999 income group, which would see, on 
average, a reduction in gasoline expenditures of about $25 per year.  This is followed by 
those with incomes over $75,000, which gain about $6.00 per year, and those in the $30,000-
$44,999 income group, which gains about $4.40.  
To get a better idea of the impact of this change on the regressivity of gasoline expenditures 
including the tax, the incidence for each income group was calculated (Table 4.4).  As 
previous researchers have found, gasoline expenditures, including the gasoline tax are 
regressive, a finding that also holds true in Oregon.  A VMT fee would also result in a 
regressive expenditure structure. (A regressive tax is one that takes a greater percentage of 
income from those in lower income groups.) 
 
Table 4.4: Comparison of incidence of gasoline expenditures under a gasoline tax and a VMT fee: 
assuming a net gas cost of $1.22 
Income Group 
Expenditures as % of Income with 
Gasoline Tax 










0-14,999 4.97% 6.63% 5.03% 6.71% 
$15,000~$29,999 3.61% 4.09% 3.63% 4.11% 
$30,000~44,999 2.97% 3.17% 2.97% 3.16% 
$45,000~59,999 2.97% 3.06% 2.97% 3.06% 
$60,000~74,999 2.62% 2.75% 2.59% 2.72% 
$75,000~$200,000 1.81% 1.81% 1.81% 1.81% 
 
However, what is of interest here is the difference between the two tax structures, focusing on 
the results that exclude zero-vehicle households (since those households are not impacted).  
The lowest two income groups showed slight increases in incidence (.08 and .02 percent of 
income) while the $30,000-$44,999 and $60,000-$74,999 income groups showed slight 
decreases (.01 and .03 percent of income). The other income groups showed no change in 
incidence. 
The very small changes in incidence reflect the fact that the taxes themselves represent a very 
small portion of total household expenditures – much smaller than the cost of gasoline itself. 
To demonstrate how small the impact of the change in tax structure is relative to the effect of 
a change in the price of gasoline between 2001 and 2006, the above analysis was re-run using 
a gasoline price of $2.64 per gallon (a $2.40 gas price net of the gasoline tax).  These results 
are shown in Table 4.5. 
What becomes immediately obvious is that the regressivity of gasoline expenditures 
increased substantially from that shown in Table 4.4.  While moving from the gasoline tax to 
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a VMT fee produced an increase in incidence for the lowest income group of .08 percent 
when the net gasoline price was $1.22 per gallon, the near doubling of gasoline prices 
resulted in an increased incidence with the gasoline tax from 6.63% to 11.99% – an increase 
in incidence of 5.33 percent.   
 
Table 4.5: Comparison of incidence of gasoline expenditures under a gasoline tax and a VMT fee: 
assuming a net gas cost of $2.40 
Income Group 
Expenditures as % of Income with 
the Gasoline Tax 
Expenditures as % of Income with 









0-14,999 9.68% 11.99% 9.74% 12.07% 
$15,000~$29,999 6.59% 7.40% 6.62% 7.42% 
$30,000~44,999 5.40% 5.73% 5.38% 5.72% 
$45,000~59,999 5.36% 5.54% 5.36% 5.54% 
$60,000~74,999 4.73% 4.98% 4.70% 4.94% 
$75,000~$200,000 3.28% 3.28% 3.27% 3.27% 
 
From this analysis it becomes clear that while a change from the gasoline tax of 24 cents per 
gallon to a VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile could have a slight impact on incidence, is it 
miniscule compared to the impact that is felt due to the general rise in gasoline prices.   
4.1 ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
As mentioned earlier, a change to a VMT fee has raised concerns, because the change in tax 
structure would effectively lower the cost of driving for “gas guzzlers” and increase the total 
amount paid by those driving more fuel efficient cars (although the changes are likely to be 
very small compared to the overall cost of gasoline).  Thus, such a change is seen as being in 
conflict with alternate goals of increasing the use of hybrid vehicles and reducing the 
dependence on fossil fuels. 
A VMT fee could be formulated in a way that minimizes or reverses this unintentional impact 
of the policy change.  Sample Scenario #1 would be a VMT fee structure that maintains the 
gasoline tax for those vehicles with fuel efficiency of less than 20 miles per gallon and 
charges a flat 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee to those vehicles with fuel efficiency over 20 miles 
per gallon.  This policy would keep “gas guzzlers” from realizing a lower cost of driving 
(which could encourage them to drive even more).  Note that since a VMT fee of 1.2 cents 
per mile would be a revenue-neutral change in fee structure, Sample Scenario #1 would 
actually result in an increase in revenues collected by the state.   
The distributional impact of Sample Scenario #1 is shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7.  Note that 
households in every income group would pay more in user fees under this scenario.  The 
increase in the user fee for those in the lowest income group would be about twice what it 
would be under a flat VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile levied on all vehicles.  However, those 
in the highest income groups would not gain (in terms of paying less in user fees) as they 
would under a flat VMT fee policy.  Indeed, those in the two highest income groups would 
end up paying between $22 and $31 more per household instead of paying less under the flat 
VMT fee scenario. 
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Table 4.6: Household annual expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #1* 

























user fee paid 
under Sample 
Scenario #1 
1 $     658.90 $     666.72 $    7.82 $     675.36 $  16.46 
2 $     917.84 $     923.03 $    5.19 $     935.01 $  17.17 
3 $  1,174.01 $  1,169.61     -$   4.40 $  1,191.91 $  17.90 
4 $  1,595.10 $  1,595.33 $    0.23 $  1,623.57 $  28.47 
5 $  1,858.85 $  1,833.51 -$  25.34 $  1,881.25 $  22.40 
6 $  1,992.60 $  1,986.60 -$    6.00 $  2,023.68 $  31.08 
*Gasoline tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT fee of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20 
 
As shown in Table 4.7, under Sample Scenario #1 both urban and rural household would pay 
more, although the increase for urban households would be slightly larger.  By comparison, a 
flat VMT fee would result in a reduction in fees paid by rural households and a very small 
increase for urban households under the simple VMT fee. 
 
Table 4.7: Urban/rural household annual expenditure changes under Sample Scenario #1* 
Location Average Expenditures 






















Rural $  1,600.17 $  1,586.56 -$  13.61 $  1,621.93 $  21.76 
Urban $  1,249.55 $  1,251.58 $    2.03 $  1,272.24 $  22.69 
*Gasoline Tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20 
 
It is also possible that Sample Scenario #1 might not provide enough of an incentive for 
people to purchase more fuel efficient vehicles.  Thus it is also useful to consider a “step” fee 
policy whereby vehicles would incur increasingly higher VMT fees, the lower the fuel 
efficiency of the vehicle.  In Sample Scenario #2 vehicles that achieve less than the median 
fuel efficiency (approximately 18 mpg) would pay 2 cents per mile; those between the 
median efficiency and 20 mpg would pay 1.5 cents per mile; and those with a fuel efficiency 
of above 20 mpg would pay only 1 cent per mile in VMT fees.  The incidence of this scenario 
on income groups and urban/rural groups is shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. 
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with 24 cents per 
gallon gas tax 
Average revenue 
with “step” VMT 
fee 
Average revenue change 
from gas tax to “step” 
VMT fee 
1 39 $  108.31 $  123.60 $  15.29 
2 75 $  150.88 $  176.66 $  25.78 
3 65 $  192.99 $  223.88 $  30.89 
4 62 $  262.21 $  305.32 $  43.11 
5 40 $  305.56 $  380.27 $  74.71 
6 67 $  327.55 $  404.11 $  76.56 
*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile 
 
Sample Scenario #2 would results in all income groups paying more, but the increase in fees 
paid is progressively higher for higher income groups and lower for those in lower income 
groups. 
 
Table 4.9: Urban/rural annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #2* 
 
Location # hhs 
Average revenue 
with 24 cents per 
gallon gas tax 
Average revenue 
with “step”  
VMT fee 
Average revenue change 
from gas tax to “step” 
VMT fee 
Rural 108 $  263.04 $  317.40 $  54.36 
Urban 256 $  205.41 $  238.46 $  33.05 
*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile 
 
Sample Scenario #2 would increase the taxes paid by both rural and urban areas, but in this 
case it the rural areas would end up paying more.  This is due to the combined effects of rural 
areas having vehicles with lower average fuel efficiency and rural households driving more 
miles. 
Thus, both sample scenarios would have the effect of increasing fees paid by all groups.   
Sample Scenario #1 would result in both urban and rural areas paying more.  However, 
Sample Scenario #1 has urban areas paying more than rural areas whereas rural areas would 
pay almost twice that paid by urban areas under Sample Scenario #2. 
4.2 AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO MEASURE REGRESSIVITY: THE 
SUITS INDEX  
The Suits Index (Suits 1977) is a way to measure the overall regressivity of a tax, or to 
compare the changes in regressivity as a result of a structural or policy change.  In this study 
one can compare the regressivity of the gasoline tax to a VMT fee.  The Suits Index, bounded 
between -1 and +1, is convenient in that it provides one number that can be compared across 
tax regimes.  A value of -1 would indicate that the lowest income group bears the entire 
burden of the tax; a value of +1 would indicate that the highest income group bears the entire 
tax burden.  A value of 0 would indicate that the proportion of the overall tax paid by each 
income group is exactly equal to the proportion of the population represented by that income 
group.  (For a more detailed explanation of the Suits index, see Appendix B.) 
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Under the gasoline tax the Suits Index is -0.176, while the Index is -0.225 under a flat 1.2 
cents per mile VMT fee, implying the VMT fee would shift some of the tax burden from the 
higher income groups to the lower income groups, making it more regressive.  The Suits 
Index for Sample Scenario #1 is -.185, indicating a greater degree of regressivity than the 
gasoline tax but less than that of a flat VMT fee.  The Suits Index for Sample Scenario #2 is 
-.162, indicating that although everyone would pay more under Sample Scenario #2, this 
policy would result in a less regressive tax structure than the other alternatives, including the 
current gas tax. 
As mentioned earlier, the analysis discussed in this chapter assumes that a change to a VMT 
fee (which would result in a change in the per-mile cost of driving for some households) 
would not have an impact on demand (the number of miles driven).  If those household 
groups in which the per-mile cost of gas increased were to respond by decreasing their 
driving, the increase in incidence for those groups would be less.  Of course, it is also 
possible that those households experiencing a decrease in per-mile driving cost would drive 
more and thus may benefit from the change in tax.  What actually occurs would depend on 
the demand response to the change in per-mile costs.   
Accordingly, the next stage of this research focused on developing an estimate of the demand 
response to the per-mile driving cost changes that would be caused by the change in tax and 
then recalculating the incidence to include the impact of the demand response 
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5.0 REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
With the regression model, also known as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, one 
addresses the relationship between household miles and vehicle type by including a 
substitution dummy variable equal to one if the household has more than one type of vehicle 
and zero otherwise.  The inclusion of this variable allows one to calculate different elasticities 
for households with multiple vehicle types and those without.  Households with multiple 
vehicle types are expected to be less responsive to fuel cost per mile changes, since they are 
able to substitute away from vehicles with a higher fuel cost per mile.   
The OLS model for this analysis is based on the following equation: 
 
 M = f (PM ,I,PM * I,U,C,SUB,PM * SUB,HHM ) (5-1) 
where  
M is the total annual miles driven by the household;  
PM  is the fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax;  
I is annual household income;  
U is a dummy variable equal to one if the household is located in an urban area, and zero 
otherwise;  
C is the number of vehicles the household owns;   
SUB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the household has more than one type 
of vehicle such as a car and truck and zero otherwise;  
PM *I is an interaction term between the fuel cost per mile and income;  
PM *SUB is an interaction term between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution dummy 
variable; and   
HHM  is a vector of household characteristics that includes the number of children (CHILD), 
number of workers (WORK) and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
household respondent is male and zero otherwise (MALE).  
 
For details and definitions for each of the variables, see Appendix C, Section C.1. 
As the fuel cost per mile increases, one would expect households to reduce miles driven; so 
the coefficient on the average fuel cost per mile should be negative.  Assuming miles driven 
is a normal good, one expects the sign on income to be positive, suggesting that as household 
income increases, the household is able to spend more of its income on miles.  One expects 
the coefficient on the location variable to be negative, which would imply that households in 
urban areas drive less than those in rural areas due to shorter commutes to work and more 
developed surroundings.   
If households have more than one vehicle, they are more likely to drive more miles.  
Households with multiple types of vehicles are able to substitute between vehicles in 
response to other variables, such as the fuel cost per mile.  This flexibility may encourage 
them to drive more, relative to other households that are not able to substitute between 
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vehicles.  West (2002) states that, “Male-headed households are even more likely to own two 
vehicles than they are to own one.”2 
As the number of children or the number of workers increase, one would expect households 
to drive more, out of necessity.  Households may have to take their children to more 
activities, increasing miles traveled (West 2002).  West finds that male-headed households 
drive more miles than those headed by females.  
The interaction term between the fuel cost per mile and income allows for different impacts 
on different income groups.  As the fuel cost per mile increases, one would expect 
households with higher incomes to drive more miles than those with lower incomes, because 
those in the higher income groups will not feel as great a burden on their total income with 
the increasing fuel cost per mile.  That is, those in higher income groups are expected to have 
a more inelastic demand, as demonstrated by West (2002).  Similarly, the interaction term 
between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution dummy variable allows for different 
impacts on those with multiple vehicle types and those without.  Presumably, households 
with multiple vehicle types are able to substitute between their vehicles, and the coefficient 
should therefore be positive.  Thus, relative to households who cannot substitute between 
vehicle types as the fuel cost per mile increases, households with multiple vehicle types are 
more likely to drive more miles. 
The OLS regression was run on household annual miles with the fuel cost per mile under the 
current gasoline tax.3  A change in policy to a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee was captured by 
subtracting the $0.24 tax out of the gasoline price, dividing the remaining net gas cost by the 
fuel efficiency and then adding a $0.012 VMT fee.4  The new fuel cost per mile – under the 
VMT fee – was thus different for every household, unless the household had an average fuel 
efficiency equal to 20 MPG.5  The incidence calculations below compare the fitted values 
from the OLS regression and the recalculated fitted values under the new fuel cost per mile 
variable, based on the estimated parameters. 
5.1 OREGON SAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS 
The authors estimated a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of annual 
household miles using the sample of 339 Oregon households from the 2001 National 
Household Travel Survey (NHTS). The results are shown in Table 5.1.   All signs were as 
expected, based on economic theory and the findings of previous studies.  All coefficient 
estimates have the expected signs, and the adjusted R2 for the model is 0.46. 
                                                 
2  Our data support West's statement.  The correlation coefficient between our male dummy variable and 
vehicle count variable was approximately 0.16.  Though not particularly high, there was a positive correlation 
between the two variables. 
3  See A2 in the Appendix for the calculation of fuel cost per mile. 
4  Empirical studies show that nearly the entire state gasoline tax burden is placed on the consumer, 
which justifies subtracting the entire $0.24 tax from the gasoline price (Chernick and Reschovsky, 1997 and 
Chouinard and Perloff, 2003). 
5  ODOT based the $0.012 per mile fee on the concept of a revenue neutral VMT fee, using an average 
fuel efficiency of 20 mpg for all non-commercial vehicles in Oregon. Thus the average household should be 
unaffected by the policy change.  This study uses the change in fuel expenditures by households as a measure of 
well-being. 
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Table 5.1: Dependent variable – annual household miles (logarithmic)† 
Variable Name Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic 
Constant -17.72* 6.239724 -2.84 
PM  -8.76* 2.388977 -3.67 
I  2.21* 0.613436 3.60 
PM * I  0.72* 0.2352192 3.05 
PM * SUB 0.44 0.4005742 1.09 
U -0.16* 0.0950097 -1.67 
C 0.54* 0.1290508 4.18 
SUB 1.39 1.050415 1.32 
MALE 0.17* 0.0874272 1.94 
WORK 0.21* 0.0528672 3.95 
CHILD 0.04 0.0393044 0.91 
† Italicized variables are logarithmic 
* All interpretations are based on a .10 significance level 
 
Income and vehicles owned by a household were found to have a positive and significant 
effect on miles driven.  The dummy variable for urban households was significant and 
suggests that urban households drive fewer miles than rural households.  Households with 
male respondents drive more miles than households with female respondents.  Household 
annual miles increase as the number of workers increases, as expected.  As the fuel cost per 
mile increases, households reduce the overall number of miles driven; however, the overall 
reduction depends on household income and whether or not the household is able to 
substitute between vehicle types.  The fuel cost per mile and the interaction term between the 
fuel cost per mile and income were statistically significant.  However, the interaction term 
between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution variable was not found to be significant.   
As the number of children increases, one would expect the household to drive more miles as 
suggested by the model; however, this was not statistically significant.  Though the 
substitution variable was not statistically significant, it had the expected sign, as discussed in 
Chapter 4.  That is, if a household is able to substitute between vehicles, one would expect 
them to drive more miles relative to a household (all else equal) that is unable to substitute 
between vehicles.   
One can interpret the coefficients of the logarithmic terms as elasticities.  The model assumes 
that the elasticity of annual household miles driven with respect to fuel cost per mile varies 
across income groups.  As expected, higher income groups, on average, are less responsive to 
changes in the fuel cost per mile, as shown in Table 5.2.  The coefficient of the interaction 
term between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution dummy variable also allows for the 
elasticity to vary between households that are able to substitute between vehicle types, and 
those that cannot.  Though not statistically significant, this coefficient was as expected and 
indicates that households that are not able to substitute between vehicle types have a more 
elastic demand, as expected.6  These households are more sensitive to changes in the fuel cost 
per mile.  It should be noted that the elasticities will vary by households; however, this 
analysis used the average income value for each group to provide an approximation.   
     
                                                 
6 The elasticity of miles driven with respect to the fuel cost per mile can be calculated as: εM ,PM = −8.6814 + 0.71* I + 0.4548* SUB . 
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Table 5.2: Elasticity by income group – based on average income 





1 $9,055.90 1.79 2.23 
2 $21,983.11 1.16 1.59 
3 $36,899.07 0.78 1.22 
4 $51,952.61 0.54 0.98 
5 $67,394.80 0.35 0.79 
6 $106,043.36 0.03 0.47 
 
The next step was to estimate the welfare impacts and changes in consumer surplus that 
would occur with a change from the current 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax to a 1.2 cents-
per-mile VMT fee.  The authors assumed a linear demand function.   
Generally, welfare is defined as the total consumer and producer surplus gained (or lost) as a 
result of – in this case – the policy change.  To society as a whole, it does not matter whether 
consumers or producers gain more.  Thus, a positive welfare gain may reflect an overall gain 
for consumers or producers.  In this case the producer is the government agency that collects 
the tax, so the change in surplus going to the producer is the change in revenues collected by 
the agency.  (See Appendix D for welfare, consumer, and producer surplus equations.) 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the average changes in consumer surplus, tax revenue and welfare 
by income group and by urban versus rural households. As expected, the changes in tax 
revenue collected by the state agency as a result of a change from the gas to a VMT fee were 
smaller in this analysis than they were in the static model, which did not account for changes 
in miles driven in response to the change in the cost of driving.  However, the change in tax 
revenue paid by a consumer only tells part of the story.  If consumers end up driving more 
than they did before the change in fees, the consumers derive a benefit from the additional 
travel that is reflected in the measures of consumer surplus.   
 
Table 5.3: Average changes in consumer surplus, tax revenue and welfare by income ($/household) 
Income Group 
Average Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
Average Change in 
Taxes paid 
Average Change in 
Welfare 
1 - $   7.51 $    5.03 - $    2.48 
2 - $   6.47 $    6.13 - $    0.34 
3 $   9.36 - $    4.24 $    5.12 
4 - $  2.41 $    8.06 $    5.57
5 $ 28.48 - $  12.92 $  15.56 
6 $ 12.77 - $    2.60 $  10.17 
 
The overall impact on social welfare is the sum of the change in consumer surplus and the 
change in producer surplus.  So for instance, in the case of Income Group 1, there would be 
an average loss in consumer surplus of $7.51 that represents both the additional amount paid 
in taxes and the value of the reduced travel that would be caused by the increase in the cost of 
driving.  Part of this would be transferred to the government agency in the form of increased 
revenue of $5.03.  The net impact on social welfare would be a loss equal to $7.51 - $5.03 = 
$2.48 (-$2.48 in Table 5.3).  Note that these represent very small changes; even for a 
household in the lowest income group this represents a change in expenditures that is less 
than 1/10 of one percent of income. 
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Overall those in the highest income groups would have a net gain: they would pay less to 
drive and this would stimulate additional travel that benefits them.  However, given the 
extremely small difference relative to their income (again less than 1/10 of one percent), this 
is not likely to alter behavior significantly. 
Thus, in the case of a demand curve with some elasticity, the change in consumer surplus 
places a dollar value on the welfare impact on consumers in each group – including both the 
change in taxes paid and the value the consumer places on the induced change in miles 
driven.  Note that the general pattern of the consumer surplus change in this model is very 
similar to the change in taxes paid in the static model, and in both cases the impact on 
households is extremely small relative to their household income or their total annual 
expenditures on driving.  This suggests that policymakers who just need a “ballpark” estimate 
of the impact of a change in highway user fees could use the results provided by the static 
model, which requires less data analysis than calculations based on the OLS regression 
model.  However, it also should be noted that this may only be true for small changes similar 
to the magnitudes considered in this study.  
 
Table 5.4: Average changes in consumer surplus, tax revenue and welfare by location ($/household)                           
Location Group 
Average Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
Average Change in 
Tax Revenue 
Average Change in 
Welfare 
Rural $ 17.40 - $  9.46 $  7.93 
Urban - $   0.62 $  4.89 $  4.27 
 
The OLS results for the Urban/Rural impacts were again similar to the static result:  urban 
households would pay slightly more under a VMT fee and rural households would pay less.  
However, the large change in consumer surplus for rural households reflects their benefits 
from increased travel that would be induced by the lower cost of driving under a VMT fee. 
Once again, the study examined the impact of sample VMT fee scenarios that could be 
considered to try and encourage use of more efficient vehicles and reduce driving.  Table 5.5 
shows the difference between the gasoline tax incidence and the incidence under VMT fee 
Sample Scenario #1.  Again, in this case households in every income group would pay more 
per year; however, there was not a clear impact on overall social welfare.  There were 
consumer surplus losses for all income groups. 
      
Table 5.5: Annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #1*   
Income Group 
Average Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
Average Change in 
Taxes paid 
Average Change in 
Welfare 
1 - $  11.80 $  13.52 $  1.72 
2 - $  16.23 $  16.25 $  0.01 
3 - $  11.81 $    9.07 - $  2.74 
4 - $  27.51 $ 33.33 $  5.82 
5 - $  19.12 $  17.93 - $  1.19 
6 - $  25.02 $  22.82 - $  2.20 
* Gasoline Tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20 
 
As shown in Table 5.6, for rural households, Sample Scenario #1 would mean an increase in 
taxes paid and a loss of consumer surplus that reflects less driving.  In this case, urban 
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households would pay more per year, but the increase in fees paid would be larger for rural 
households. 
 
 Table 5.6: Urban/rural annual household expenditure changes under Sample Scenario #1* 
Location Group 
Average Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
Average Change in 
Tax Revenue 
Average Change in 
Welfare 
Rural - $  17.81 $   19.68 $   1.88 
Urban - $  19.46 $   18.90 - $   0.55 
*Gasoline Tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20 
 
For Sample Scenario #2, results for the distributional impact are presented in Table 5.7.  Here 
the losses in consumer surplus for the highest income group would be almost six times as 
large as those for the lowest income group, although again all groups would end up losing 
both in terms of consumer surplus and in terms of additional taxes paid per year. 
 
Table 5.7: Annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #2* 
Income 
group # hhs 
Average change in 
consumer surplus 
Average change 
in tax revenue 
Average change 
in welfare 
1 39 - $   8.68 $  11.11 $    2.43 
2 74 - $ 17.77 $  20.42 $    2.65 
3 61 - $ 29.69 $  30.74 $    1.06  
4 60 - $ 33.92 $  36.23 $    2.31 
5 39 - $ 63.32 $  80.30 $  16.97 
6 66 - $ 62.34 $  86.99 $  24.64 
*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; 
c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile 
 
Finally, Table 5.8 shows the impacts on the rural/urban households resulting from Sample 
Scenario #2.  This alternative would impose even larger negative impacts on both urban and 
rural households than Sample Scenario #1, and rural households would pay an average of 
over $58 more per year than under the current gasoline tax. 
 





Average change in 
consumer surplus 
Average change 
in tax revenue Average change in welfare 
Rural 101 - $  37.45 $  58.81 $  21.36 
Urban 238 - $  34.88 $  37.51 $    2.62 
*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile 
 
Thus, while Sample Scenarios #1 and #2 were designed to prevent a VMT fee policy from 
discouraging adoption and use of more fuel efficient vehicles, they would result in placing 
rural households at a greater disadvantage relative to urban households, compared to a flat 1.2 
cents-per-mile VMT fee. Both sample scenarios would not have a revenue-neutral impact, as 
all households would pay more in fees, although in general the sample scenarios would 
impose larger costs on higher income households than lower income households. 
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5.1.1 The Suits Index 
As in the static model, the Suits Index was also calculated for the OLS model.  Under the 
gasoline tax, the Suits Index was approximately -0.133 compared to a Suits Index 
approximately equal to -0.142 under a flat 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee, implying that the 
VMT fee would shift some of the tax burden from the higher income groups to the lower 
income groups, making it slightly more regressive.    The Suits index for Sample Scenario #1 
was -.145, indicating a greater degree of regressivity than either the gasoline tax or a flat 
VMT fee.  The Suits Index for Sample Scenario #2 was -.111, indicating that, although 
everyone would pay more under Sample Scenario #2, this policy would result in a less 
regressive tax structure than the other alternatives. 
5.2 SENSITIVITY TESTS ON THE REGRESSION MODEL  
Sensitivity tests were conducted to further validate the regression model. These tests showed 
how the model output variable (i.e., the dependent variable) varied as the input variables 
changed within a certain range. The output variable in the regression model was the total 
household vehicle miles driven in a year. The input variables included fuel cost per mile, 
income, urban/rural dummy, vehicle count, gender of household head, number of workers in 
household, and number of children in household. For instance, in anticipation of higher fuel 
prices in the future, one could conduct a model sensitivity test in which the fuel cost per mile 
of driving is artificially increased. The model-predicted reduction in household vehicle miles 
driven can then be observed and evaluated for reasonableness and validity.   
In each of the three sets of the sensitivity tests, the authors varied the values of fuel price, 
vehicle fuel efficiency (MPG), and fuel tax respectively, while keeping the other variables 
intact. The initial values of the input variables in the model were set as follows based on the 
average values of the whole sample:  
Fuel price = $1.22/gallon 
Federal tax = $0.18/gallon  
state tax = $0.24/gallon 
MPG = 21  
Income = $51,000  
No. of workers = 1             
No. of children = 1  
No. of vehicles = 2 
 
Results of the sensitivity tests are documented below. 
5.2.1 Changing fuel price 
To determine the impact of fuel price change, fuel price was varied from $1 to $10 per gallon 
in increments of 25 cents. The lowest income group was the most sensitive to changes in fuel 
prices. The lowest line on the first graph in Figure 5.1 shows that when fuel price was 
increased from $1 to $10 per gallon, the households with $10,000 household annual income 
significantly reduced their household vehicle miles driven from 9,000 miles to about 6,000 
miles. The sensitivity decreased with increases in household income, suggesting that the 
higher the income group, the lower the impact of a change in fuel price. Households with one 
vehicle were the most sensitive to a fuel price change, whereas there was no marked 
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difference in sensitivity between households with two or more vehicles. Location, gender of 
household head, number of children in household, and number of workers in household were 
sensitive to fuel price increases at the beginning, but the sensitivity gradually declined as fuel 
price was increased. 
5.2.2 Changing vehicle fuel efficiency (MPG) 
To determine the impact of change in MPG, it was varied from 5 to 50 mpg in increments of 
5 mpg. As shown in Figure 5.2, the lowest income group was the most sensitive to changes in 
MPG. The sensitivity decreased with increases in household income. Households with one 
vehicle were the most sensitive to an MPG change, whereas there was no marked difference 
in sensitivity between households with two or more vehicles. Location, gender of household 
head, number of children in household, and number of workers in household were sensitive to 
changes in MPG at the beginning, but the sensitivity gradually declined as MPG was 
increased. 
5.2.3 Changing fuel tax  
To determine the impact of fuel tax changes, the state fuel tax was varied from $0 to $1 in 
increments of 5 cents. As shown in Figure 5.3, the lowest income group was the most 
sensitive to changes in fuel tax. The sensitivity decreased with increases in household 
income, and higher income groups were not as sensitive to changes in the fuel tax. 
Households with one vehicle were the most sensitive to a fuel tax change, whereas 
households with two or more vehicles were relatively insensitive to fuel tax changes. Also 
location, gender of the household head, the number of children, and number of workers in a 
household were not very sensitive to fuel tax changes. 
Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis suggested that the OLS model results were 
consistent with expectations and demonstrated the robustness of the model over reasonable 















Figure 5.3: Sensitivity test results – changing fuel tax 
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5.3 EXPANDED SAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS 
For comparison, the authors also conducted the OLS regression using the expanded, seven-
state data set obtained from the cluster analysis.  The OLS results are presented in Table 5.9. 
 









Constant -9.43126 2.143266 -4.40 
PM -5.618888 0.8021254 -7.00 
I 1.512523 0.2035075 7.43 
PM * I 0.4509653 0.0761085 5.93 
PM  * SUB 0.5578698 0.0980905 5.69 
U -0.1091431 0.0333623 -3.27 
C 0.7225826 0.04566409 15.83 
SUB 1.636189 0.2657104 6.16 
MALE 0.1323724 0.0289016 4.58 
WORK 0.1739668 0.0171458 10.15 
 
With an R2=0.44, the explanatory power of the OLS model run using this expanded data set 
was not significantly different from that of the OLS model using the Oregon-only data set 
(R2=0.46).  Since a larger data sample should yield a higher R2 than a smaller sample if the 
samples are drawn from the same population, the fact that the R2 for the expanded sample 
OLS model did not increase suggests that there may still have been significant differences 
between Oregon and other states that were not taken into account.  Since the purpose of this 
study was to examine the impact of the policy change on Oregon households, the authors 
decided to base the study results on the Oregon-only OLS regression coefficients rather than 
those obtained using the expanded data sample.  The expanded data set was nevertheless 
expected to be useful for future estimation of the discrete-continuous choice model, which is 
more data intensive than the OLS model.   
5.4 SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL 
The preliminary results in the estimation of the simultaneous equation model (SEM) were 
unsatisfactory.  Thus, given time limitations, the research team (in consultation with the 
technical advisory committee), decided to drop the simultaneous equation model from further 
consideration and focus on the OLS model and the discrete-continuous choice model.   
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6.0 DISCRETE-CONTINUOUS CHOICE MODEL 
As mentioned earlier, the discrete-continuous choice model is conceptually superior to the 
other models used in this study.  However, given the complexity of the model and the data 
requirements, the investigators did not have time to completely develop this model and use it 
to provide a full distributional analysis.  This chapter provides the preliminary results 
obtained in refining the model and using it to measure distributional impacts. Some 
possibilities for future research are also suggested. 
6.1 METHODOLOGY  
The model adopted here is similar to the one proposed by Kenneth Train (Train 1986). It is 
based on the assumption that households will simultaneously choose the number of vehicles 
to own, the type of vehicle and the annual miles driven in each vehicle.  
The discrete-continuous model consists of a discrete model for the vehicle number choice and 
the vehicle type and a continuous model for the vehicle miles driven. A household first 
chooses the number of vehicles to own as shown in Figure 6.1. Based on the number of 
vehicles, it then chooses the types of vehicles to own. A household owning a single vehicle 
can own either a car or truck. Households owning two vehicles can choose to own either cars 
or trucks, or a car and a truck. Similarly, households with three vehicles can choose between 
all cars, all trucks, two cars and a truck, or two trucks and a car. As the vehicles a household 
chooses to own increases, the options available for the types or combinations of vehicles to 
own also increases. For simplicity purposes, households owning more than three vehicles 
were not considered in this analysis. 
The vehicle usage, i.e., vehicle miles driven, by each household is dependent on the types of 
vehicles it owns. This model can be run at both the household level and the vehicle level; i.e., 
the total annual miles for each household can be taken as the dependent variable, or the 
vehicle miles driven for each vehicle can be considered. Since the vehicle-miles-driven 
model at the vehicle level could not be run (due to insufficient data), only the results of the 






Figure 6.1: Diagrammatic representation of the discrete-continuous choice model 
6.1.1 Vehicle number choice model 
In this model a household could choose not to own any vehicle or one, two, or three vehicles. 
Households owning more than three vehicles were ignored. The vehicle choice model can be 
represented by Equation 6-1: 
 
 N= f (I, U, HH) (6-1) 
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where the number of vehicles a household chooses to own (N) is dependent on a number of 
factors, such as income (I), household location (U), and other household characteristics (HH).  
6.1.2 Vehicle type choice model 
The vehicle type model can be represented by Equation 6-2: 
 
 T= f (Pv, Pm, I, U, HH) (6-2) 
 
where the type of vehicle a household chooses to own (T) is dependent on a number of 
factors, including fuel cost per mile (Pm), the price of the vehicle (Pv), income (I), household 
location (U) , and various other household characteristics (HH). 
6.1.3 VMT model at the household level 
The VMT model can be represented by Equation 6-3: 
 
 VMT= f (Pm, I, U, HH) (6-3) 
 
where the total annual miles a household drives (VMT) is dependent on a number of factors 
such as fuel cost per mile (Pm), income (I), household location (U), and various other 
household characteristics (HH). 
The description of the variables used in the DCC model is presented in Appendix C, Section 
C.2. 
6.1.4 Alternative model specifications 
Different specifications can be used to run the models described above. Interactions between 
various variables can be tried, to capture the effects they have on the dependent variables. 
6.1.4.1 Interaction between policy variables 
For the vehicle type model, the fuel cost per mile and vehicle price were considered as 
a percentage of income, since it provided a better understanding on the vehicle type 
choice decisions made by the individual rather than the fuel cost per mile or vehicle 
price alone. Similarly, an interaction between the two variables was also considered 
(Pv*Pm). 
  
 T= f (Pv/I, Pm/I, Pv*Pm, U, HH) (6-4) 
 
where the type of vehicle a household chooses to own (T) is dependent on fuel cost 
per mile as a percentage of income (Pm/I), the price of the vehicle as a percentage of 
income (Pv/I), the interaction of the two (Pv*Pm),  household location (U) , and 
various other household characteristics (HH). 
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6.1.4.2 Interactions between the policy variables and cost variability by state  
Vehicle prices and gas prices are not constant for all states. Thus another model 
specification for the vehicle type choice model included the interaction between 
dummy variables for various states and fuel cost per mile (States*Pm) or vehicle price 
(States*Pv). This interaction was added to capture the effect to some extent. 
 
 T= f (Pv, States*Pm, U, HH) (6-5) 
 T= f (Pm, States*Pv, U, HH) (6-6) 
 
Similarly, for the vehicle use model the interaction between fuel cost per mile and 
income was considered (Pm*I).    
 
 VMT=f (Pm,Pm*I,I,U,HH) (6-7) 
 
where the vehicle miles traveled on a vehicle (VMT) is dependent on the fuel cost per 
mile (Pm), Income (I), Household location (U) and various other household 
characteristics (HH). 
Different specifications were tried for the models described and only the best model 
for each category is presented in this report. 
6.2  DATA  
The data for this model were obtained from the 2001 National Household Travel Survey 
(NHTS). The vehicle type model especially requires a large data set, and Oregon had only a 
limited number of households. To overcome this problem, cluster analysis was used to come 
up with six other states similar to Oregon, which included Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Utah, Virginia and Washington. The discrete-continuous choice model was thus run using the 
data from these seven states. 
The descriptive statistics for the vehicle number choice model, the vehicle type choice model, 
and the vehicle use model are provided in Tables 6.1 through 6.3. 
6.2.1 Vehicle number choice model 
The number of vehicles a household owns was included in the household file and the vehicle 
file of the 2001 NHTS data set. The data set was arranged for households owning no vehicles, 
one vehicle, two or three vehicles. The model was estimated with reference to the households 
owning no vehicles. The descriptive statistics for this model are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Total observations 407 466 994 681 200 737 705 4190 
HHs with 0 vehicles 19 17 41 23 6 31 32 169 
HHs with 1 vehicle 100 122 243 178 39 176 173 1031 
HHs with 2 vehicles 163 183 414 272 88 296 291 1707 
HHs with 3 vehicles 76 90 174 127 35 155 126 783 
HHs with more than  
‘3’ vehicles 49 54 122 81 32 79 83 500 
Final observations*        3353 
0-vehicle HHs 18 10 34 19 6 26 24 137 
1-vehicle HHs 90 113 212 162 39 160 160 936 
2-vehicle HHs 154 168 371 247 78 274 264 1556 
3-vehicle HHs 68 85 157 119 34 144 117 724 
*The number of final observations is less than the total observations because the household income, location, and education of the 
household head were not reported for some households. 
 
6.2.2 Data for the vehicle type choice model 
As described earlier, vehicle type choice is a function of vehicle price, fuel cost per mile and 
other characteristics. The 2001 NHTS data set included the make and model code of each 
vehicle a household owned. The value of the vehicle in the year 2001 was considered 
regardless of the year it was manufactured.  The vehicle prices were obtained from the 2001 
Ward’s automotive year book for all the available 2001 light vehicles in the U.S market 
according to the make and model (Wards Communications 2001). However, the 2001 Ward’s 
automotive year book does not specify the prices of vehicles of outdated makes and models 
(e.g., Hyundai Excel which was manufactured during 1984-1994). Therefore, the households 
with these unavailable vehicle prices were dropped from the data set. 
In order for the household choice between a car and truck to be captured, all vehicles were 
categorized in to these two vehicle groups. Different categorizations were tested based on the 
miles per gallon a vehicle achieves, vehicle dimensions, and vehicle weight. This information 
was obtained from the following sources: 
• NHTS Classification  
The 2001 NHTS data set included the variable ‘Vehicle type’ which divided the 
vehicle into eight categories: car, van, SUV, pickup truck, other truck, recreational 
vehicles, motorcycles and other. For the vehicle type choice model cars, vans and 
SUVs were grouped into the ‘Car’ category, and pickup trucks and other trucks were 
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placed into the ‘Truck’ category. RV’s and motorcycles were ignored, as the vehicle 
price data for RV’s was not available.  
This classification seemed reliable, as it was directly obtained from the NHTS data 
set. This approach also made the work of arranging the data easier. However, a few 
discrepancies were found in the data set; for example, a Ford pickup was categorized 
as a van. 
• MPG Classification 
Vehicles were divided into ‘cars’ and ‘trucks’ based on their miles-per-gallon rating. 
The vehicles were classified based on the EIA adjusted fuel efficiency figures from 
the NHTS data set. The vehicles which had less than 20 miles per gallon were 
categorized as ‘trucks,’ and those with 20 or greater miles per gallon were categorized 
as ‘cars.’ Future studies could explore categorizing the vehicles based on a threshold 
fuel efficiency value other than 20 MPG to see if it gives better results. 
This model displayed the correct signs for most of the coefficients and they were 
significant when compared to the results obtained from the NHTS classification.  This 
was the second-best model after the vehicle weight classification. 
• Wards Classification 
Wards Automotive year book for 2001 divided vehicles in to various subcategories.7  
Criteria for this segmentation were based on the body style, typical base price and 
size. For vehicles where size was a major factor in determining categorization, length 
was the lead determinant. Using the length criteria, the vehicles in the sample were 
categorized into ‘small cars,’ ‘medium cars’ and ‘trucks.’ All cars, including luxury 
and sports cars, were included under a ‘cars’ category and all SUVs, light trucks and 
heavy trucks were considered as ‘trucks.’ Various models were tested. This approach 
resulted in a more complicated model and thus required a bigger data set. The results 
are not presented in this report.  
• Vehicle weight classification 
Vehicle weights were obtained for each make and model of the vehicle from the 
internet auto guide (http://www.internetautoguide.com). The median vehicle weight 
was used to categorize the vehicles into ‘cars’ and ‘trucks.’  
After running several models using different specifications for the above classifications, the 
authors found that using vehicle weight classification gave better results with significant 
coefficients and correct signs than using the NHTS categories, the MPG categories, or the 
Wards categories. A future study could investigate a classification of the vehicles based on 
different weight ranges other than the median weight to see if it gives better results. 
The descriptive statistics for the vehicle type model using the vehicle weight classification is 
presented in Table 6.2. 
                                                 
7 Lower small car; Upper small car; Small specialty car; Lower middle car; Upper middle car; Middle specialty 
car; Large regular cab; Lower, middle and upper luxury car; Luxury specialty and sports car; Small and middle 
cross utility vehicle; Small , middle and large sport utility vehicle; Small, large and luxury vans; Small and 
Large pickups. 
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One vehicle type         
Number of 
households owning a 
car 
32 52 86 53 13 95 70 401 
Number of 
households owning a 
truck 
21 26 83 52 12 39 35 267 
Total 53 78 169 105 25 134 105 669 




20 26 39 36 12 55 32 220 
Number of 
households owning a 
car and truck 




19 27 89 34 10 35 37 251 
Total 73 99 218 133 39 164 132 858 








2 3 9 5 1 6 8 34 
Number of 
households owning 
two cars and a truck 
5 17 14 7 6 16 10 75 
Number of 
households owning 
two trucks and a car 
4 9 15 11 3 13 13 68 
Total 12 30 46 27 11 45 33 204 
 
6.2.3 Vehicle use model 
The vehicle use model was run at the household level. The NHTS data set included the total 
annual miles driven by each household and also the vehicle miles for each vehicle separately. 
A separate VMT model was developed for each category of vehicles a household chooses to 
own, based on the schematic in Figure 6.1. The descriptive statistics for this model are 
presented in Table 6.3. 
 
62 







































One vehicle type 
 
        
Number of households 
owning a car or truck 
50 75 169 102 22 128 98 644 
Two vehicle types         
Number of households 
owning both cars or both 
trucks 
17 52 53 25 9 38 28 222 
Number of households 
owning a car and truck 
19 45 35 25 8 28 26 186 
Total 36 97 88 50 17 66 54 408 
Three vehicle types         
Number of households 
owning all cars or all trucks 
1 1 4 9 2 4 2 23 
Number of households 
owning two cars and a truck 
(or) two trucks and a car 
2 1 12 6 2 11 7 41 
Total 3 2 16 15 4 15 9 64
 
6.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
All estimations were performed using the program LIMDEP Version 9.0. Results of the final 
models are shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. The parameters of the discrete model were 
estimated for three alternatives (i.e., one, two or three vehicles), and the zero-vehicle 
condition was considered as the base alternative. The coefficients of the model indicate the 
propensity to own one, two, or three vehicles with positive values indicating an increase in 
the probability and negative values indicating a decrease in the probability. The same applies 
for the vehicle type and vehicle use models. 
6.3.1 Vehicle choice model 
The vehicle number choice model showed that income and location has a significant effect on 
the number of vehicles a household chose to own. As income increases, a household is more 
likely to own a vehicle. The probability of owning more vehicles (i.e., two or three) increases 
with income as shown in Table 6.4. Similarly, a household living in an urban location is less 
likely to own a vehicle than a household in a rural location; and the likelihood of owning 
more than one vehicle decreases for households living in an urban area. This seems 
reasonable, since people living in urban areas tend to have more access to other modes or 
transportation such as rail or bus, compared to those in rural areas. 
Household characteristics also have a significant impact on a household’s likelihood of 
owning vehicles. As the ratio of children to household size increases, households are more 
likely to own vehicles. Similarly, an increase in number of workers and the presence of a 
male household head increases the probability of owning vehicles. According to the results 
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obtained from this model, households with a head belonging to a young or middle age group 
are less likely to own vehicles than households headed by older people. This result could be 
interpreted that young and middle-aged people are more active and flexible and prefer to use 
other modes of transportation. 
 
Table 6.4: Estimation results for Vehicle ownership model 
Dependent variable: Number of vehicles a household chooses to own 
Number of households = 3353 
 One Vehicle  Two Vehicles  Three Vehicles  
Variable name Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 1.461** 0.504** -0.834** 
Income (I)  0.0003** 0.0005** 0.0006** 
Urban (U) -0.322* -0.763** -1.131** 
male 0.314* 0.526** 0.710** 
Children/Household size 1.174** 2.118** 1.743** 
Worker count 0.478** 1.464** 2.034** 
Young -1.485** -2.173** -2.772** 
Middle -1.170** -1.848** -2.068** 
** Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level             
   * Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level          
 
6.3.2 Vehicle type model 
Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show results for the vehicle type model, for the one-, two-, and three-
vehicle households.  As fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income increases, people are 
less likely to own any kind of a vehicle. The same is true for vehicle price as a percentage of 
income. The one-vehicle and two-vehicle type models suggest the same thing. The three-
vehicle model, however, gave an inconsistent result. This can probably be attributed to the 
insufficient data.  
If a household is located in an urban area it is more likely to choose to own a car over a truck, 
and it is also more likely to choose CC8 over a CT or two trucks and will choose a CT over 
TT.  The model was estimated with reference to the household owning two trucks.  Similarly 
for the three-vehicle type, the signs of the coefficient indicate that an urban household will be 
less likely to choose CCC or CCT over TTT and TTT over TTC, although they are not 
statistically significant, as shown in Table 6.5. 
Larger households are less likely to own a car over a truck. They are also less likely to own 
CC over a CT and a CT over TT. This coefficient for the three vehicle types is not 
statistically significant, though the signs indicate that larger households are more likely to 
own CCT over TTT and CCC. With an increase in household size the probability of choosing 
TTT over CCC and CCC over TTC is less. Households with more number of workers are 
likely to choose car over truck and CC over CT and TT over CT. Households with younger 
household head are likely to choose car over truck. Similarly, younger household heads are 
more likely to choose CC over CT and CT over TT more that the middle aged household 
heads.  
                                                 
8 For simplicity, the following notations are used: CC-Both cars; CT-Both trucks ;TT-Both trucks; CCC-all cars; 
TTT-all trucks; CCT-Two cars and a truck; TTC-Two trucks and a car 
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Table 6.5: Results for vehicle type models – one-vehicle households 
One-Vehicle households (Truck as the reference) 
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (Car) 
Number of households= 669 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -0.22 
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm) -7.11 
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv) -0.97 
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv) 0.02* 
Urban(U) 0.62** 
Household size -0.35** 
Children/Household size 0.36 
Worker count 0.40** 
Young 0.51* 
Middle 0.12 
** Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level             
   * Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level          
 
Table 6.6: Results for Vehicle type models – two-vehicle households 
Two Vehicle households (Both trucks – TT – as the reference) 
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (both cars – CC) 
Number of households= 858 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -0.99** 
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm) -539.58* 
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv) -0.77 
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv) 0.05** 
Urban (U) 0.90** 
Household size -0.37* 
Children/Household size -1.22 
Worker count 0.30* 
Young 1.37** 
Middle 0.67** 
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (car and truck – CT) 
Number of households= 858 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -0.32 
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm) -539.58* 
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv) -0.77 
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv) 0.05** 
Urban (U) 0.41** 
Household size -0.02 
Children/Household size -0.89 
Worker count  -0.11 
Young 1.13** 
Middle 0.87** 
** Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level             
   * Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level          
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Table 6.7: Results for vehicle type models – three-vehicle households  
Three-Vehicle households (Two trucks and a car – TTC – as the reference) 
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (all cars – CCC) 
Number of households= 204 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -1.28 
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm) -1187.66 
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv) -1.63 
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv) 0.50 
Urban (U) -0.62 
Household size -0.24 
Children/Household size -3.69 
Worker count 0.58 
Young 1.74 
Middle 0.51 
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (all trucks – TTT) 
Number of households= 204
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -0.26 
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm) -1187.66 
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv) -1.63 
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv) 0.50 
Urban (U) -0.003 
Household size -0.41 
Children/Household size 3.95 
Worker count 0.16 
Young -1.05 
Middle -0.42 
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (two cars and a truck – CCT) 
Number of households= 204 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -0.66 
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm) -1187.66 
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv) -1.63 
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv) 0.50 
Urban (U) -0.62 
Household size 0.01 
Children/Household size -2.91 
Worker count 0.46 
Young 1.99* 
Middle 0.32 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
   * Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
6.3.3 Vehicle use model 
Table 6.8 shows the results for the vehicle use model.  Even though the coefficients are not 
significant for most of the variables, the signs do predict several possibilities.  As the fuel 
cost per mile for a vehicle increases, households are more likely to drive fewer miles, except 
for households with three vehicles. People living in urban areas drive less compared to those 
in rural areas. Households with higher incomes and those with more workers are likely to 
drive higher miles. Similarly, a younger person is likely to drive more miles compared to an 
older person, except for two-vehicle households owning both cars and trucks. People living in 
an urban area are less likely to drive more miles. The model shows that the number of 
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children and household size does not have a consistent effect on the number of miles a 
household drives.  
 
Table 6.8: Results for vehicle use model 
 Dependent variable: Annual household miles driven by a household 





Car and a 
truck 
All cars or 
trucks 
Two cars and 
a truck (or) 
Two trucks 
and a car 
Number of 
observations 644 222 186 23 41 
Variable name Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 5.66** 8.22** 7.37** 9.15** 15.09** 
Fuel cost per 
mile -1.05** -0.45* -0.53** -0.28 2.02** 
Fuel cost per 
mile*Income 0.0001** 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 -0.0002** 
Income 0.0003** 0.00005 0.00008 0.00007 -0.0006** 
Urban -0.17* -0.07 -0.14 -0.13 -0.09 
Children -0.09 0.06 -0.02 0.11 -0.002
HHsize -0.07 0.15 0.04 -0.09 -0.26
Wrkcount 0.29** 0.14** 0.05 0.05 0.37** 
Young 0.39 -0.14 0.24 0.12 0.74** 
Middle 0.35 0.06 0.12 0.23 0.42* 
Italicized variables are log transformed 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level             
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level             
    
6.4 APPLICATIONS OF THE DISCRETE-CONTINUOUS-CHOICE 
MODELS FOR TRANSPORTATION POLICY ANALYSIS 
Public policies influence the mode, frequency and distribution of travel for consumers. Any 
policy which discourages people from buying and using vehicles, or which charges fees 
based on miles or emissions, have potential distributional impacts. Any of these policies 
could induce some drivers to drive less, own one vehicle instead of two, or choose to buy a 
car instead of an SUV.  Discrete-continuous choice models can be used to estimate the long-
run distributional effects of such polices. 
6.4.1 VMT fee 
Discrete-continuous choice models can be used to estimate the impact of a VMT fee policy as 
described in this section. The miles driven on a vehicle by a consumer depends on the type of 
vehicle he chooses to drive and also the availability of other vehicles. If the consumers are 
charged based on the miles driven, it might induce some to drive less or use more public 
transit or carpools. A family with multiple cars, who used to drive individually, might choose 
to travel together or carpool. Changes can be seen at both distributional and behavioral levels. 
DCC models can capture these effects. Some argue that a VMT fee might discourage people 
from buying more fuel efficient vehicles. It is apparent that these models can be used to 
estimate the long-run effects of such a policy. 
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6.4.2 Emission taxes 
Emission taxes can be charged on a mileage basis to reflect emission rates per mile. This is a 
policy often suggested to reduce environmental pollution. Cars produced in a given year are 
subject to emissions standards that have become increasingly stringent over time.  Thus, the 
age of a vehicle may play an important role in determining the emissions, especially if older 
cars have higher emission rates. 
DCC models can be used to estimate the effects of such a policy on car choices, driving 
behavior (such as miles driven), and the effects of those driving behaviors on emissions. If a 
vehicle emissions tax is imposed, then drivers may buy a newer, cleaner car or a smaller car 
with better fuel efficiency, fix their pollution control equipment, buy cleaner gas, or drive 
fewer miles. An emissions tax could induce consumers with different incomes or household 
characteristics to choose different combinations of these methods or choose other alternatives 
according to their economic efficiency. Some with old cars may switch to newer or smaller 
cars, while others may chose to take transit.  
6.4.3 Policies that discourage vehicle ownership and use 
Apart from the above policies, higher vehicle prices, fewer subsidies to buy new motor 
vehicles, higher parking policies, higher registration fees, etc., may discourage vehicle 
ownership and use. Providing increased subsidies to public transit, thereby increasing the 
efficiency and reducing fare charges, may encourage people to use transit. Policies such as 
congestion pricing schemes and other distance-based charges can encourage people to use 
more transit. All these policies have an impact on the driving behavior of the consumers.  
The authors have developed a working discrete-continuous choice model which is capable of 
estimating the impact of a VMT fee. The current model estimates the probabilities of 
households owning a specific number of vehicles, type of vehicles, and household miles 
traveled under the current gasoline tax and a VMT fee in three stages. More time is required, 
however, to modify and further improve the existing DCC model so as to estimate the three 
models (vehicle number choice, vehicle type choice, vehicle use) simultaneously, which can 
give consistent coefficient estimates.  Thus further research using a DCC model is 
recommended to help quantify the impacts of a VMT fee and other alternative policies.   
In addition, the DCC model has been developed only at the household level; development of 
the model at the vehicle level was not possible due to insufficient data.  Thus future research 
on a DCC model at the vehicle level will need a larger and more complete data set than what 




7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Given the projected shortfalls in highway revenues available for building and maintaining 
highways, the state of Oregon has been exploring alternatives to the current state gasoline tax 
of $.24 per gallon.  The Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF), appointed by the Oregon 
legislature to study the issue, suggested that a vehicle mileage fee might be considered as a 
replacement for the gasoline tax for light vehicles.  Given concerns that were expressed 
regarding a change to a VMT fee structure, this study was undertaken to develop analytical 
techniques that can be used to examine the distributional impacts of alternative fee structures.  
The three major concerns were as follows: 
• The change to a VMT fee would be regressive, placing disproportionate hardship on 
those in lower income groups.  
• Rural areas in Oregon would be adversely impacted relative to urban areas. 
• A change to a VMT fee would discourage people from acquiring alternative fuel 
vehicles or more fuel efficient vehicles and thus would be contrary to the state and 
national priority of reducing fossil fuel use. 
This study developed three different methodologies that can be used to examine these issues.  
The authors first used a static model that assumes that households do not change their 
behavior in response to a change in the structure of user fees.  Next the distributional effects 
of such a policy change were analyzed using the results from an OLS regression model that 
does consider the feedback effects on driving resulting from a change in user fees.  These 
were simple models that did not incorporate long-run vehicle choice responses to the policy 
change.  Thus, the static and OLS models could only deal with the first two concerns listed 
above.  Accordingly, the study then developed a two-stage discrete-continuous choice model 
that was conceptually more satisfactory and potentially able to deal with the third concern, 
but which was much more complex and data intensive. 
The results from both the static and the OLS models suggested that the income distributional 
impact of changing to an approximately revenue-neutral VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile 
would result in a very small increase in regressivity relative to the regressive structure of the 
current gasoline tax.  The impact was very small for the lowest income group, amounting to a 
change of less than one percent of their income.  As a comparison, the increase in total 
gasoline expenditures that was caused by the near doubling of gasoline prices from $1.46/ 
gallon to $2.64/gallon between 2001 and 2006 was over five percent of income for the lowest 
income group. 
Given that the impact on income groups was virtually identical in both the static and the more 
complex OLS regression models, it may be best for policymakers to use the simpler model, 
as it is easier to explain.  Since the user fee change was a very small percent of income for all 
income groups, and there is a relatively inelastic demand for driving (especially in the short 
run), it makes sense that these two approaches gave similar results in this situation.  The 
results from both of these models suggest that the VMT fee considered here would have a 
negligible impact on income distribution or on driving behavior.  Indeed, the impact of the 
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overall increase in gasoline prices between 2001 and 2006 had a much bigger impact on 
income distribution and still did not seem to have a significant impact on miles driven. 
While the change to a VMT fee may slightly increase regressivity, the impact on rural areas 
was found to be opposite to that suggested by conventional wisdom.  On average a household 
in a rural location would pay less under a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee than under the current 
gasoline tax, whereas those in urban areas would pay slightly more.  This was largely due to 
the lower overall average fuel efficiency in the rural vehicle fleet relative to the urban fleet 
and the greater number of miles driven on average by rural households. 
On the final concern, that a VMT fee would discourage adoption of more fuel efficient 
vehicles, the discrete-continuous model offered an appealing approach from a theoretical 
point of view.  However, the authors were not able to refine it enough to produce robust 
results.   Findings from the static and OLS models suggested that the change to a VMT fee is 
not likely to create a significant disincentive to purchase more fuel efficient or hybrid 
vehicles.  Once again this is because the change in fee structure has such a small impact on 
the cost of driving relative to the price of gasoline.  Indeed, it is continued increases in 
gasoline prices, which dwarf the change in per mile user fees, that will be the factor giving 
people the incentive to purchase more fuel efficient cars regardless of whether Oregon has a 
gasoline tax or VMT fee structures such as the ones considered in this study. 
It has been suggested that any disincentive effect to purchasing fuel efficient vehicles could 
be ameliorated by designing an appropriate VMT fee structure (Whitty and Imholt 2005; 
Whitty 2007).  Using both the static and OLS models, the authors examined two sample 
scenarios other than a flat 1.2 cents-per-mile fee.  While both alternate schemes eliminated 
the perceived disincentive, they were not revenue neutral; indeed, everyone would pay more 
in user fees under these scenarios. 
The first sample scenario was to keep the gasoline tax of 24 cents per gallon for vehicles with 
fuel efficiency below 20 miles per gallon and apply a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee for 
vehicles that achieve 20 miles per gallon or more. The second sample scenario was a 
“stepped” VMT fee such that vehicles getting less than the median miles per gallon would 
pay 2 cents per mile, those between the median and 20 miles per gallon would pay 1.5 cents 
per mile, and those vehicles with over 20 miles per gallon would pay 1 cent per mile. 
While these sample scenarios would increase taxes paid by all, the impact was much greater 
on those in rural areas, who would pay relatively more than their urban counterparts.  When 
regressivity was measured using the Suits index, the first scenario was found to be more 
regressive than the flat fee of 1.2 cents per mile, whereas the second scenario was less 
regressive than the flat fee of 1.2 cents per mile.  In any case, both a VMT fee and the current 
gasoline tax were shown to be regressive forms of taxation. 
An obvious conclusion is that it is not possible to use one policy instrument such as a flat 
VMT fee to achieve multiple policy objectives.  Interestingly, a mileage fee has been 
proposed to help keep the highway finance system viable, while it has also been proposed as 
a way to tax vehicular emissions and as a way to structure driver insurance rates.  Although 
these alternatives proposed for a mileage fee are seen as ways to curb environmental 
pollution and reduce accidents, it appears that they could increase the regressiveness of the 
tax system. 
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Thus, policymakers need to consider other policy options that can be used, possibly 
simultaneously, to help achieve multiple goals.   Suggested policies may be differentiated 
VMT fees (as considered in this study) or other pricing schemes such as congestion pricing or 
tolling roads and bridges.  Parking policies, subsidies for alternative fuel or hybrid vehicles, 
additional fees or taxes on vehicles with low fuel efficiency and/or high pollution emissions, 
or subsidies for public transit may also be perceived as ways to achieve alternate policy 
results that seem to conflict with a VMT fee. The evaluation of these welfare-improving 
policies requires more sophisticated modeling tools that capture households’ adjustments in 
vehicle fleet size, type, and use decisions. Although Pareto-improving policies on financing, 
energy conservation, and environmental conversation in the transportation sector are pursued, 
it is likely that these aforementioned policies will also create winners and losers, which 
deserves the attention of future research.   
Whatever the combination of policies, there will still be the need to evaluate the potential 
distributional effects of regulatory action.  To examine short run distributional changes, the 
static and OLS models provide reasonable results as changes in vehicle ownership are likely 
to take place over a long time horizon.  The long-term distributional effects are likely to be 
somewhat different, since people in different income groups may have differing abilities to 
purchase newer vehicles, so the analysis becomes more complex.  Given the long-run policy 
goal of promoting fuel efficient vehicles, the authors recommend further development of the 
discrete-continuous choice model, as it is much better able to deal with the long-term 
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APPENDIX A: INCOME GROUPS 
The NHTS assigns households into one of 18 categories. We assigned the median value of 
each category to each household. 
 
Table A.1: Income groups 
Income 
Category Income Ranges 
Value Assigned to 
Household 
1 $0 ~ $5,000 $2,500.00 
2 $5,000 ~ $9,999 $7,499.50 
3 $10,000 ~ $14,999 $12,499.50 
4 $15,000 ~ $19,999 $17,499.50 
5 $20,000 ~ $24,999 $22,499.50 
6 $25,000 ~ $29,999 $27,499.50 
7 $30,000 ~ $34,999 $32,499.50 
8 $35,000 ~ $39,999 $37,499.50 
9 $40,000 ~ $44,999 $42,499.50 
10 $45,000 ~ $49,999 $47,499.50 
11 $50,000 ~ $54,999 $52,499.50 
12 $55,000 ~ $59,999 $57,499.50 
13 $60,000 ~ $64,999 $62,499.50 
14 $65,000 ~ $69,999 $67,499.50 
15 $70,000 ~ $74,999 $72,499.50 
16 $75,000 ~ $79,999 $77,499.50 
17 $80,000 ~ $99,999 $89,999.50 




Due to the relatively small number of Oregon households in the NHTS sample, this meant 
that there were very few households in some of the above 18 income groups.  Accordingly, 
we reorganized Oregon households into six income groups as indicated below in Table A.2 
so as to provide a reasonable number of households in each category. 
 







                                                 
9 The 2001 NHTS does not have an upper bound for this last income group.  According to the Census 2000 for 
Oregon, only 1.8% of all households have a total income greater than $200,000. 











APPENDIX B:  SUITS INDEX, GRAPHS AND TABLES 
 
The Suits Index is another way to measure the regressivity of a tax, or to compare the 
changes in regressivity as a result of a structural change.  In our case, we can compare the 
regressivity of the gas tax to the VMT fee.  The Suits Index is convenient in that it provides 
one number that can be compared across tax regimes.   
Similar to the Gini Coefficient, the 45 degree line represents the points were the proportion of 
the tax paid by each income group exactly equals the proportion of the population.  Points 
above the 45 degree line suggest lower income groups pay more than their proportion of total 
income, suggesting a regressive tax.  Similarly, points below the 45 degree line would 
suggest lower income families pay a lower proportion of a tax than their proportion of 
income, suggesting a progressive tax. West (2002) and Walls and Hanson (1999) both 
conclude a per-mile emissions fee is regressive, by calculating a Suits Index. 








We multiply the area by 1
5000
 to keep the Suits Index bounded by -1 and 1, since the area of 
the upper or lower triangle will be 5000.  A value of -1 suggests a perfectly regressive tax 
where the lowest income group bares the entire tax burden.  On the other extreme, a value of 
1 suggests the highest income group bares the entire tax burden.  A Suits Index equal to 0 
implies we are on the 45 degree line and the tax is exactly proportional.  Thus, we are 
attempting to calculate the area between the curve and the 45 degree line.  Since we only 















Figure B.1.1: Suits index for $0.24 gasoline tax 
Suits Index =   -0.17623 
 
 












Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated tax 
(%) 
1 2.179938882 5.380472998 
2 11.64535438 19.79382503 
3 25.18959838 35.77177459 
4 43.36117767 56.47871052 
5 58.5510772 72.04696128 




Figure B.1.2: Suits index for VMT fee 
Suits Index =   -0.22542 
 
 















Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated tax 
(%) 
1 2.179938882 7.545591225 
2 11.64535438 26.45669222 
3 25.18959838 42.12619447
4 43.36117767 59.05973543
5 58.5510772 72.50101607 
6 100 100 
B-4 
 
Figure B.1.3: Suits index for Sample Scenario #1 
 
Suits Index =   -0.18493 
 
 





          
Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated tax 
(%) 
1 2.179938882 5.785054908 
2 11.64535438 20.59514314 
3 25.18959838 36.30203978 
4 43.36117767 57.31056656 
5 58.5510772 72.30439055 
6 100 100 
B-5 
 
Figure B.1.4: Suits index for Sample Scenario #2 
Suits Index =   -0.16165 
 
 















Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated tax 
(%) 
1 2.179938882 5.136838462 
2 11.64535438 19.256235 
3 25.18959838 34.7640426 
4 43.36117767 54.93690353 
5 58.5510772 71.1466093 




B.2 SUITS INDEX BASED ON OREGON OLS MODEL 
 
                 
 
Figure: B.2.1: Suits index for $0.24 gasoline tax 
 
Suits Index= -0.133 
 
Table B.2.1: Suits index based on income group for $0.24 gasoline tax 
Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated gas tax 
(%) 
1 2.080566517 4.262081525 
2 11.66367121 17.52323622 
3 24.92327769 32.47211488 
4 43.28629319 52.69766516 
5 58.77005121 69.69442618 
6 100 100 
 
 




Figure: B.2.2: Suits index for VMT fee 
Suits Index= -0.142 
 
                                           
Table B.2.2: Suits index based on income group for VMT fee 
Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated VMT 
(%) 
1 2.080566517 4.552139586 
2 11.66367121 18.47365438 
3 24.92327769 32.97689647 
4 43.28629319 53.88760427 
5 58.77005121 70.05302579








Figure: B.2.3: Suits index for alternate policy 
Suits Index= -0.14466 
 
Table B.2.3: Suits index based on income group for alternate policy 
Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated tax 
(%) 
1 2.080566517 4.62185976 
2 11.66367121 18.3890603 
3 24.92327769 32.74655801 
4 43.28629319 53.90247825 
5 58.77005121 70.34788312 







           




Figure: B.2.4: Suits index for step fee 
 
Suits Index= -0.110720 
 
Table B.2.4: Suits index based on income group for step fee 
Income group Accumulated income (%) Accumulated step fee 
(%) 
1 2.080566517 4.009637876 
2 11.66367121 16.69068834 
3 24.92327769 31.20241687 
4 43.28629319 50.37868655 
5 58.77005121 68.13748159 





APPENDIX C:  DETAILED DATA DESCRIPTIONS 
C.1 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES FOR OLS ANALYSIS 
 
The data used in the OLS estimation is based on the NHTS data, or were derived from the 
NHTS data set.  All variables used are described below.  If the variable was modified, it is 
described in this table. 
Variable  Variable Name Description  
PM  Fuel Cost Per Mile 
Under the Gasoline 
Tax 
Weighted average by miles driven.  The fuel cost per 
mile used in the estimation is the fuel cost per mile 
under the gasoline tax.  Fuel cost per mile for 




Where Piis the reported fuel price and MPGi  is the 
EIA adjusted fuel efficiency in the NHTS data.  If 
the MPG was not reported for a particular vehicle, 
the average for reported vehicle MPG was used for 
the missing value(s).  Thus, for a household with 
two vehicles,  


















⎦ ⎥  
Where m1 is the reported miles for vehicle 1, m2 is 
the reported miles for vehicle 2 and M = m1 + m2. 
 
I Household Income NHTS reported income group.  Households put 
themselves in one of 18 income categories based on 
income ranges.  We then assigned households the 
median value for their category.  For example, 
income group 3 was defined as a household that 
earns between $10,000 and $14,999.  Thus, for this 
household, I = ln(12,499.50).   
SUB Substitution Indicator Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household owns 
more than one type of vehicle and 0 otherwise.  This 
is based on the NHTS variable for “vehicle type.” 
1 = Car/Station Wagon  
2 = Van 
3 = SUV 
4 = Pickup Truck 
5 = Other Truck 
6 = RV 
7 = Motorcycle 
91 = Other 
We treat values 4 and 5 as the same, and consider 
these as “trucks,” though this was not an issue in the 
Oregon OLS sample.   
For example, if a household owns two cars, SUB=0.  
C-2 
If a household owns a car and a van, SUB=1. 
U Location Indicator Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is 
located in an urban area, 0 otherwise.  Location 
indicators are based on the Census 2000 definition.   
According to the Census 2000, an urban area is 
defined as an area with:  
1. “Core census block groups or blocks that 
have a population density of at least 1,000 
people per square mile and 
2. “Surrounding census blocks that have an 
overall density of at least 500 people per 
square mile.” 
(From U.S. Census Bureau, Available at: 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua_2k.html.  
Accessed on August 24, 2007) 
C Vehicle Count This variable was modified from the vehicle count 
variable in the NHTS dataset.  If a household 
reported zero miles driven on a vehicle, that vehicle 
was excluded, and subtracted from the NHTS 
vehicle count variable.  Also, if miles for a vehicle 
was missing, it was again assumed the vehicle was 
not used and was subtracted from the NHTS vehicle 
count. 
MALE Gender of Household 
Respondent Indicator 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household 
respondent is a male, 0 otherwise.  Unmodified from 
the NHTS data set, except that the NHTS uses 
values 1 and 2, which we changed to 0 or 1. 
NHTS: Defines Male=1, Female=2.  We change the 
NHTS variable to Male=1, Female=0. 
WORK Number of Workers 
in Household 
Unmodified variable from the NHTS dataset. 
CHILD Number of Children 
in Household 
Derived from the NHTS dataset.  We define the 
number of children as the total number of people in 
the household minus the number of adults. 
PM * I  Product of Fuel Cost 
Per Mile and Income 
This is an interaction term between the fuel cost per 
mile for the household and the household income.  
This allows for different elasticities for different 
income groups. 
PM * SUB Product of Fuel Cost 
Per Mile and the 
Substitution Indicator
This is an interaction term between the fuel cost per 
mile for the household and the substitution dummy 
variable.  This allows for different elasticities for 




C.2  DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES FOR DCC ANALYSIS 
 
Variables for the DCC are the same as those defined for the OLS except for those differences 
listed below. 
   
Pm Fuel cost per mile as 
a percentage of 
income 
Derived for each vehicle from the vehicle file of 
the NHTS data set. It is computed as gas cost 
(GSCOST) divided by miles per gallon 
(EIADMPG). This value is then divided by 
income. 
Pv Vehicle price as a 
percentage of income
For each make and model as given in the vehicle 
file of the NHTS data set, the vehicle prices were 
obtained from the Ward’s year book 2001. This 
vehicle price is then divided over income. 
HHsize Household size This value is obtained directly from the 2001 
NHTS data set. 




The number of children is obtained by subtracting 
the number of adults (given in the NHTS data) 
from the household size. 
Young and 
Middle 
Age of the household 
respondent 
The NHTS data set has an age variable. This is 
divided in to three categories Young (age<=30); 




APPENDIX D: CONSUMER SURPLUS, REVENUE AND 
WELFARE DEFINITIONS  





(PM − PVMT )∗ (MILESGAS + MILESVMT ){ } 
 
The difference (PM − PVMT ) determines the sign of the change.  If the fuel cost per mile under 
the VMT ( PVMT ) fee exceeds the fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax ( PM ), we expect a 
reduction in total consumer surplus as we move upward along the linear demand curve.  
Similarly, if the fuel cost per mile decreases under the new policy, we expect household miles 
to increase as it becomes cheaper for households to drive and thus, increase the total 
consumer surplus as we move downward along the linear demand curve.   
Revenue collected by the state agency for each household is calculated using the following 
equation, 
 








⎦ ⎥  
 
Household miles are based on the predicted (fitted) values estimated by the model, first under 
the gasoline tax ( MILESGAS), then under the VMT fee ( MILESVMT ).  To calculate the net 
gasoline taxes collected, we consider only the $0.24 collected per gallon sold.  Since we do 
not estimate the miles driven on individual vehicles, we cannot calculate the gasoline tax 
revenue collected by vehicle.  Instead, we use the weighted average household fuel efficiency 
( HHMPG ) to calculate the per-mile cost in terms of the gasoline tax.  We consider only a 
flat-rate VMT fee, and we can calculate the revenue collected by multiplying the per-mile fee 
($0.012) by the predicted household miles under the VMT fee. 
Since we do not calculate a supply function, we use the revenue collected by the state agency 
to calculate the welfare changes, rather than the standard producer’s surplus.  Thus, welfare 
for each household is calculated as, 
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